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BEING AND ACTION

André Marc, S.J.

EFFICIENT CAUSALITY IN HUMAN ACTIONS

Marianne Miller Childress

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THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

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BEING AND ACTION

André Marc, S.J.

I. SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT

Although the person is the "total synthesis" of all the ideas already elaborated[1] and is the eminently real being, we are not at the end of our efforts till we have set down in more precise detail the constitution of the person. Problems of change always remain suspended, and an exhaustive explanation is not given simply by saying that change supposes act and potency in general. Since change implies a being which develops and grows, because it has begun to be and because that possibility of growth is not intelligible except in a being which is susceptible of growth, the mind asks how such a being can be conceived — whether it began by the absolute beginning of creation or by a beginning in the midst of a series of generations. The mind has then examined how a being must be interiorly constituted to be able to be engendered or created. The solution of this problem is given by the distinction and composition of essence and existence, of matter and form.

If a beginning is necessary for growth, it is not enough; and the compositions indicated above, though they are necessary for the possibility of development in a being, do not state that a development has occurred. They constitute the substantial essence of a changing being, stressing in it the element of permanence and stability; they do not admit of "more" and "less" in their own line, but express an indivisible, an unvarying character — *stant in indivisibili.* On the other hand, change demands "more" and "less"; we must discover a variable in being. This is the task which remains, in order that the dialectic will be exhaustive and that we may complete the synthesis of the person or of every changeable being in general. Movement, with

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[1] This article is the fourth chapter of the third book of a work soon to appear in print, *La Dialectique de l'Affirmation.* The first book treats of being and its transcendental properties and answers the question, What is it "to exist"? The second book considers the divisions of being and investigates the constitution of that which exists. The third book investigates the categories of being and looks into that which is. Its first three chapters explain how the existent is first of all substance, individual, and especially person. At this point this article begins. [It has been translated from the French by the Reverend George P. Klubertanz, S.J.]

which we started, and which is the spontaneous movement of a living organism, demands an act and consequently the distinction between being and acting. Over and above the compositions already discovered between potency and act in the interior of a substance, change must itself be expressed by another composition, that of substance and accident.

Consequently, change is not possible in our universe except by a triple application of act and potency: essence and existence, matter and form, substance and accident. The first two of these define the essential constitution of being, the third concerns its action. Perhaps some reader will suspect that all this is mere machinery and that it destroys the unity of a being. Before accepting this conclusion, let him carefully follow the reasonings which lead to such conclusions; let him recall that a finite being cannot be simple and that to find the real unity of such a composite being, it is enough to consider its elements as relations, as the theory of act and potency invites us to do.

The analyses of movement, in showing us that at each moment in which it is considered it is rest and impetus, act and potency, arrival and departure, have shown us these two traits: permanence and change — permanence, by the element of synthesis, unification, simultaneity, which makes movement like a whole present to each moment in each of its parts; change, because the whole is not given as already made, not as realized, but as making itself, as realizing itself. From permanence, thought has concluded first to finality, thanks to which the changeable being guards its identity and reality; secondly, to the individual subsistent substance (or in the case of man) to the person. But this person, far from excluding change and multiplicity, demands them, since substance or person, understood in this way, are "real and developing ideas."[2] At the same time that they suppose a subject — or, better, are a subject — they suppose also a development, which will be a real becoming. If substance explains the fact that change presents itself as a whole which maintains its identity, it does not explain by itself the progressive aspect of that whole, which passes little by little from the less to the more perfect, from potency to act. These acts are not achieved in one stroke; they become, while the substance is. It and they are opposed and distinguished as act and potency. They suppose a potency in substance, a potency which constitutes the permanent element and which they will complete. Whereas the substance is in itself, like an absolute, they are not in themselves, but in it; they are relative to it. This contrast of relative and absolute is a new reason for their distinction. Substance is not in a subject, seeing that

[2] ". . . idées réelles et évolutives" (A. D. Sertillanges, O.P., *Saint Thomas d'Aquin* [Paris: Alcan, 1925], I, 79).

it presents itself as a subject; the accident does not present itself as a subject, but demands a subject in which to be. This trait is the first of its constitutive characteristics and the one from which all the others flow.

Let us note first the process of reasoning which establishes these propositions. It may be that Aristotle was able to justify them by an analysis of language, in such a way that "the distinction between substance and accident, so important in his philosophy, appears like a transposition of the grammatical pair, subject-attribute."[3] The dialectic does not have recourse to this demonstration. If the pair of words *subject-attribute* at times somehow expresses the pair *substance-accident* it does not correspond exactly. In this work it is superfluous to recall again that, even verbally, the subject and the attribute in the expression "Peter is wise" do not make up a whole like substance and accident, since they represent in thought, not two elements composing a whole, but one and the same whole considered and expressed differently. Still less can we believe that the distinction between substance and accident reflects that between the noun and the adjective, having no greater compass than the latter. Many ideas or realities are sometimes expressed under the form of a noun, at other times of an adjective. If the categories of language and grammar have governed the categories of being in one or the other philosopher, this is not in itself necessary. We refer to being rather than to language, and "the principle of this classification is based on the theory of act and potency,"[4] of which it is only an application. Ultimately it rests on being, since substance and accident are opposed by their different relations to being. The former is directly related by itself, immediately; the latter indirectly by an intermediary, which serves as a support for it. From this characteristic it is properly named συμβεβηκος by Aristotle, *accidens* by the Latins.[5]

II. THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF ACCIDENTS

These conclusions immediately suggest new investigations. If the accident to which we have concluded is to explain the progress of a being, it must itself be developing and progressive. And this it cannot

[3] J.-M. Le Blond, S.J., *Logique et Méthode chez Aristote* (Paris: Vrin, 1939), p. 312.
[4] Abbé Baudin, "L'Acte et la puissance dans Aristote," *Revue Thomiste*, VII (1899), 597.
[5] "De fait l'étymologie est à peu près la même, συμβαινω, marcher avec, *accidens*, tomber sur. C'est la même idée de juxtaposition, de conjonction, de contact. . . . Les mots français, qui rendraient le mieux l'expression grecque seraient *contingent*, coïncidant . . . [Entendons par là] des choses qui n'altèrent pas l'essence, mais qui sont réunies à l'essence par *contiguité;* . . . [qui] sont *contingentes*, c'est-à-dire viennent s'ajouter au concept de l'essence" (Th. de Regnon, S.J., *Métaphysique des Causes* [Paris: Retaux-Bray, 1886], Book II, chap. iii, nos. 3,9).

be unless, instead of being defined in itself, it is comprehended in function of a term to which it is ordered and to which it is more or less close. To fulfill these conditions, such an act, in one way or another, must be *intentional,* because it is a relation to an end. Since the idea of person integrates in itself all other notions, among them that of finality, we must here turn to the person. The contrast of being and action is transposed in it into that of being and tendency. Here the dialectic comes into play again.

If the intentional action of being alone justifies its possible measure of development and demands a potency which it actuates in developing itself, a problem arises concerning the nature of that potency. Since act and potency, inasmuch as they are correlative, are on the same plane, is it not necessary that the potency of acting be intentional just as acting is and, like it, an accident which is not in itself nor an ultimate subject, but in a substance from which it also is distinct? But in the case where action and the correlative potency are accidents, are they equally accidental? When the concept of accident is applied to them, is it analogous or univocal? And if it is analogous, as it seems metaphysical notions must be because of their generality due to their closeness to being, in what can that analogy consist? What is the law of their differences?

Since we have met these questions and discussed the difficulties which they raise in *Psychologie Réflexive,*[6] in regard to man and the distinction between the soul and its faculties, we will summarize that discussion here and content ourselves with a presentation after the manner of a counterproof in the perspectives of metaphysics.

Here, then, is an initial proposition from which all the others will develop: To intentional acting, which is an accident, there corresponds in a being a potency, which is also distinct as an accident from substance. If acting is intentional and tendency, it is necessary that the power from which it springs to actuate it be itself an intentional power, a faculty of tendency, since the sources of an act cannot be of another order than it, seeing that they are identified and characterized by it. Between the intentional order and substance a distinction must be maintained as well as a relation. Thanks to this, they will be irreducible to each other, although they are joined precisely as substance and accident. Based on substance without being identical with it, the whole intentional order is in it, both acting and the faculties of acting. The whole intentional order is opposed to substance, for it is defined

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[6] André Marc, S.J., *Psychologie Réflexive* (Bruxelles: L'Edition Universelle, 1949), II, 237-66.

as a relation to an object, while substance is defined by itself and in itself. The contrast between them is that of the relative and the absolute, which cannot be confounded with each other. As substance, being is terminated in itself, while in the intentional order the proper characteristic of acting is to set up a relation with the outside. No matter how closely these two things are bound together, since relation supposes the being which enters into relation, they are not identical and must be distinguished. The fact of entering into relation supposes the power of being joined; this latter must then be other than substance — that is to say, must be in it without being what it is. Therefore it verifies the notion of accident. Being is capable of progress by that potency which is on the intentional plane and not directly by its substance. Operation is referred to substance by the mediation of a faculty.

This thesis follows rigorously from the correlation of act and potency, two things being supposed — first, that act and potency are proportioned; secondly, that that proportion is analogous and varies according to a law with the variation of the terms. To be truly analogous, the proportion of act and potency will be an analogy of proportionality. Up to the present point, this proportion has been presented under three particular aspects: essence and existence, matter and form, substance and accident. The first two constitute substance. What are the similarities and the differences between them — in other words, what is their analogy? How are act and potency in each instance adapted to each other? To establish this, let us repeat some considerations.

Progressive movement as it has been considered in experience — from which we have deduced the general idea of act and potency — implies a point of departure and a term with the passage from one to the other. By reason of the fact that this is not instantaneous but takes time, we must distinguish in it becoming and accomplishment, the *fieri* and the *factum esse,* the moment when it is being made and the moment when it has been made. Between these two a growth is supposed. The beginning, inasmuch as it is possible by creation or generation, demands in the substance of the being the composition of essence and existence and that of matter and form. Now, in the proportion of essence and existence which accounts for creation, there is evidently no point of departure, no *terminus a quo,* which is prior in time. Where there was nothing, there is a thing; and a point of departure, if one is needed for the convenience of the imagination, is only logical. The actuation of the essence by *esse* is instantaneous, for the essence in itself is indivisible and does not admit more or less.

Neither is there a mean between being and not being. It is therefore impossible to distinguish between the becoming which is being made and the accomplishment which has been made, between the *fieri* and the *factum esse,* because there is no development. Nevertheless, since the *esse* is adapted to the essence which receives the *esse* according to its capability, there is a proportion between the one and the other.

Compared to this case where the being which begins presupposes nothing, the composition of matter and form which explains generation demands a pre-existing matter to be informed in order to be generated. It is therefore necessary to speak of a point of departure, and this is a first difference. Nevertheless, the information of matter by the specific form is brought about in a single moment, since the form as such is indivisible and does not admit more or less; hence, it is impossible to distinguish two moments. They are intermingled, and the actuation of matter by form has nothing of progress. In this it is like the actuation of essence and existence. There is also a resemblance in this, that the form is adapted to the matter, since the latter receives only a form capable of being material. In short, there are resemblance and difference in the nature of the composition of act and potency; hence, analogy of proportionality.

Now let us consider the case of substance and accident, when the latter is developing and progressive. Contrary to the former cases, it admits of more and less and does not make up something absolutely indivisible, for it is not defined in itself but in function of an object to which it is more or less close. If the proportion of act and potency is a universal law, it is necessary to recognize here a potency adapted to that act and to characteristics of a new kind. This potency cannot be immediately the essence of the being – that is, the composite of matter and form – or the subsistence of that same being – that is, the composite of essence and existence. These two compositions or proportions have different traits from that of the act now under discussion. The latter opposes becoming and its accomplishment, the fact of being in the making and being achieved; the former two do not admit that contrast, are related only to themselves, not to anything else, not to any object, and express no intentionality. Therefore the potency, the immediate subject of the intentional and accidental operation is not the substance directly or the essence of that being, but a potency of the intentional and accidental order, that is, a proper faculty. This will be defined by its act and the object of that act. Like that act, the faculty will be susceptible of more and less, of evolution. To that intentional and accidental level it will be rigorously proportioned. There are therefore resemblance and difference with

regard to the preceding cases, as is necessary so that the proportion of act and potency really be an analogy of proportionality. The distinction of being and acting involves that of the being and its faculties by an application of the law which adapts act and potency to each other.

About this proportion of act and potency as such, let us say what we have said about the idea of being as such. From that concept, which is not that of any being in particular, but that of all in general according to their relations and their hierarchy, the dialectic proceeds to form the ideas of different beings and their constitution. Similarly, the proportion of act and potency as such, although disengaged from one particular case (that of change) does not represent precisely a particular case of that proportion, but all the particular proportions of potency and act according to a law of analogy in general. With that as a beginning, the particular proportions can be derived.

This analogy has a further role to play. Our conclusions prove that, in being divided into operations and faculties, the idea of accident is itself analogous, for it is verified differently in both. Inasmuch as they are accidents, they are referred to substance, for they are in it. If they are analogous, they must be in it differently. In fact this is so.

First, operation is rooted in substance by the mediation of the faculty; but the latter is implanted in substance by itself without any intermediary.

From this first difference others follow. The bond with substance, being more or less close, is consequently more or less necessary. Although a being capable of acting cannot exist without faculties of a definite and determined nature and although in a sense it cannot be without acting, without performing some operation in general, it can exist without performing this or that definite operation. Determined by the circumstances of time and place where its liberty may be found, the particular operations are contingent accidents, whereas the faculties are necessary accidents. The definition of accident which metaphysically is verified differently in the two cases, is verified differently also from the logical point of view, according as its bond with the essence is necessary or contingent. As necessary accident, the faculty is still a property of the being. By this necessity it is related to essence, while it is related to operation inasmuch as it is an accident; it is naturally the bridge between the two.

If minds more familiar with modern philosophers than with the Scholastics judge this structure of being too complicated, there may perhaps be a way of making it more acceptable, by resorting to the ternary process lauded by Hamelin: thesis, antithesis, synthesis. To

substance, which is eminently a thesis since it is a subject with necessary and constitutive notes, there is the antithesis of the accident, which is not a subject but is contingently present in a subject. The faculty brings about a synthesis of the two, since it is their unity. Hence these three terms: *substance, operation, faculty,* or *being, acting, faculty.*

This present dialectic of beings in general must rest with generalities, without stating precisely which are the faculties. Since they are relative to operations and to specified objects, they vary with them in different beings. To circumscribe them more in detail would be to pass from a dialectic of being as such to those of particular beings. But our task here is simply to furnish universal principles, which permit a successful undertaking of these different enterprises which do not begin with movement in general, but with this or that clearly characterized movement. Thus, *Psychologie Réflexive* began with the movement of the body, which is language and sign of knowledge. Every being is then known in its proper structure in function of the primary laws of being as such, or of act and potency.

Nevertheless, the relation of operations to their faculties is not entirely analyzed without the prevision of certain eventualities. Operations are different, as their objects are; it is still necessary to indicate certain principles of difference which pertain to being as such and to investigate the consequences that can follow. There are some operations so determined by their nature that they are invariably referred to the same object under the same aspect. When they are multiplied, this is less a variation than a repetition of the same operation. In this case the faculties from which they spring are sufficiently equipped to accomplish the operations, because they are exactly defined by their object. In the instinctive and natural operations of living things there is no room for finding an intermediary between the faculty and its operation. There are other faculties, which are not defined by a limited object, but by absolutely universal and transcendental points of view which are aimed at in different beings. This distinction pertains to the idea of being as proportion of essence to existence. An operation can look to a definite essence or be ordered to being itself; it can remain on the plane of essence or be elevated to the transcendental. The second hypothesis involves possibilities which are absent from the first. Our mind can go to being by different essences, that is, by different ways, none of which are preferentially determined. And while it is engaged on one way, it can go back to take another. These eventualities which are offered to our action and our faculties flow from the indetermination which must be removed in a consistent way. For, once a path toward being has been chosen,

though others may equally well lead there, it is necessary to hold one's self to the same path and continue the effort with constancy in order to reach the term. By retracing one's steps ceaselessly, by beginning again indefinitely, one will never arrive. The faculty, then, is not entirely equipped by itself; it demands an additional energy which will determine it in giving it directions which it did not have of itself. If the acts which it performs are to progress with unity, once certain directions are taken, these acts will not be repeated always identically, like the seasons; they will be multiplied in being diversified. In the sciences, for example, they will extend themselves to more numerous and varied objects. While a perfection is realized in unity, it seems in this case that it must tend there by a multiplicity, a diversity of acts. To safeguard the rights of unity, we must find it in unifying that multiplicity. There must be a bond between the acts, which synthesizes them and makes each persist in the others, ephemeral though they are in themselves. This bond can only be in the faculty from which these acts spring. That supplement of energy, which arms the faculty for acting, is not only an orientation in a single direction; it is also a power of synthesis and of organization of acts among themselves, so that it possesses them surely and easily. Thus, the being conducts itself with ease and certitude, without hesitation, in the perfect mastery of its action. This virtuality added between acting and the faculty is called *habitus* and is divided into the sciences, arts, and virtues. The antithesis of the unity of the faculty is the variety, the multiplicity of the acts; and habit produces the synthesis of that unity and diversity. Hence, there is a new ternary process: *faculty, acts, "habitus."*

Without repeating here a doctrine of habit, which has been explained before,[7] let us indicate only that in its best, most spiritual, and least mechanical sense, it implies consciousness and liberty to develop. The unconscious automatism is only a counterfeit. Directing the activity of the being in the line of its nature, habit looks, through acts of ever-increasing richness, to the organization of the person in larger and stronger syntheses which flow from one idea, from one love, and color the largest possible number of psychological elements. In this way it sinks ever deeper roots into the soul, whose unity it achieves in incorporating an ideal within it.

> To produce unity in the bosom of a multiplicity is the essential law of habit. The more a synthesis is at once ample and centralized, the more it responds to its ends.

[7] *Ibid.*, II, 187-236.

> . . . The man who is most a man is he who tends to make an organic coherence of all the psychological facts which multiply in his consciousness; to unify them around the most human of ideas, that is, the most reasonable. The learned man will unify these facts around the *true,* the artist, around the *beautiful;* the saint, around the *good.* The genius, who is a vigorous spontaneity disciplined by a long endurance, will be he who synthesizes into a perfect harmony virtue, science, and art.[8]

In the person, who is more than a simple individual, in addition to acting and the faculty, there is also necessary another species of accident, habit, which makes it fully "qualified."

This very diversification which is established from the point of view of act and potency is the proof of the analogous character of the accident. From substance to faculty, from faculty to action by way of habit, being is distinguished and shaded off, as the traits of the accident become stronger, inasmuch as it is accidental and temporary, "that which can," in the judgment of Porphyry, "be present or absent, without destruction of the subject."[9] Nevertheless, it is remarkable that these ephemeral acts take root in the permanent to leave durable traces there, even definitive ones — habits. Hence it is right to emphasize "the architectonic role of normal action."[10] Such "accidents" are in no sense something merely accessory; quite the contrary. Nothing is more important than they. Nothing is more necessary — obligatory, that is — for the progress of a being which achieves itself through them and realizes its destiny. By them the person is its own proper work of art which produces itself. If its development is an ascent into interior unity, if its progress is the fruit of habit and the work of liberty, its arts realize the conditions of beauty which is the unity of the true and the good. A person is autonomous and free only to be authentically and morally beautiful, to be thus the beauty of the universe because there is in it truth, goodness, value. This conclusion rejoins the conclusions by which we completed the deduction of the transcendentals and confirms them.

---

[8] "Faire l'unité au sein d'un multiple, telle est la loi essentielle de l'habitude. Plus la synthèse est à la fois ample et centralisée, et mieux elle répond à ses fins. . . . L'homme le plus homme est celui qui tend à faire la cohésion organique de tous les faits psychologiques qui se multiplient dans sa conscience autour de l'idée la plus humaine, entendez la plus raisonnable. Le savant fait l'unité autour du *Vrai,* l'artiste autour du *Beau,* le saint autour du *Bien.* Le génie qui est une vigoureuse spontanéité disciplinée par une longue patience, serait celui qui synthétiserait en une parfaite harmonie, la vertu, la science et l'art" (Abbé Bernard Roland-Gosselin, *L'Habitude* [Paris: Beauchesne, 1920], pp. 72-73).

[9] Cited in André Lalande, *Vocabulaire Technique et Critique de la Philosophie* (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1926), p. 11.

[10] Maurice Blondel, *L'Action* (Paris: Alcan, 1937), II, 211.

We must try to understand the unity of substance and accident in being. If both are acts, it is a truism to say that they are not equally acts (*ex aequo*). The substance, especially the substantial form, is act by itself and gives being absolutely in actuating a pure potency. Opposed to this, the accident does not give being absolutely, but some quality or other modality; and its subject is a being already in act. Being and act are thus in the substantial form before they are in the subject or potency which it actuates and where it causes being.

> On the contrary, actuality is found in the subject of the accidental form before it is found in the accidental form itself. Consequently, the actuality of the accidental form is caused by the actuality of the subject. Thus, the subject, inasmuch as it is in act, is productive of it. This is said of the proper, per se accident. For in regard to an external accident, the subject only receives it, but an external agent produces such an accident.
>
> Secondly, the substantial and accidental forms differ, in that matter is for the sake of substantial form — the less principal is for the sake of the more principal; but on the contrary, the accidental form is for the sake of the completion of the subject.[11]

To take St. Thomas's word, the substance is the source of the faculties and their operations, in that the faculties flow from its essence by a kind of "natural overflow," to permit it by these operations to enter into contact with the outer world. But in being the source of its faculties and operations, the substance is likewise their term and end, because it produces them and receives them in itself where everything is begun and completed. Nevertheless the emanation of the faculties and the operations does not happen in the same way. The faculties "emanate from their subject, not by any kind of change, but by a kind of natural overflow,"[12] while the operations produce precisely an evolution by their appearance. It is then clear that the unity of the proper accident with the substance is greater than that of the contingent accident. This is a delicate point. Since substance and accident make up only one and since they are related as act and potency, they must be united in the same being in order to be really one, seeing

[11] "Sed e converso, actualitas per prius invenitur in subiecto formae accidentalis, quam in forma accidentali; unde actualitas formae accidentalis causatur ab actualitate subiecti. Ita quod subiectum, inquantum est in potentia, est susceptivum formae accidentalis; inquantum autem est in actu, est eius productivum. Et hoc dico de proprio et per se accidente; nam respectu accidentis extranei, subiectum est susceptivum tantum; productivum vero talis accidentis est agens extrinsecum. Secundo autem differunt substantialis forma et accidentalis, quia cum minus principale sit propter principalius, materia est propter formam substantialem; sed e converso forma accidentalis est propter completionem subiecti" (St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae,* I. 77. 6.)

[12] *Ibid.,* ad 6.

that unity drives from being. But if the accident has the same being as the substance, how is it that it is not substantial? And if, in order that it may not be substantial, it is accorded a being different from that of the substance, how is it not now a substance of itself? Are there not then two beings? Either the accident is substantialized and its notion is overrefined, or the unity of substance and accident is destroyed. These are the alternatives.

To escape, it is important to understand that the same answer cannot be made for the proper accident or faculty and for a contingent accident like operation. Though it is entirely an accident, the proper accident is a necessary "property" of the essence, from which it cannot be separated. The faculties are so closely bound to the being which decks itself with them as soon as it is, that their flowering forth implies no becoming, but has the immobility, the permanence of the substance itself. To take account of these traits, it is necessary to admit that these faculties or proper accidents participate in the very being of the substance. Since they must unfold themselves from that essence inasmuch as it is in act and be received in it inasmuch as it is in potency (*esse* being that by which this essence is in act), the faculties can ultimately flow only from that *esse*. In this way the being of the essence is still that of the faculties; there is only one and the same substantial being of the two. Yet it does not follow that the faculty is essence or substance, since, being of the intentional or relative order, it remains irreducible to that which is absolute. No matter how close the bond between the two in being, it does not identify them.

The contingent accident is not explained in the same way, for no one says of operations "that they exist at the same instant as the soul,"[13] necessarily and always, as we say of the faculties. Instead of opening out the being once for all in its essential line, they bring to it an increase of being and existence. Let us say, then, that this surplus is not the substance but is accidental in it; substance and operation constitute one and the same accidental being. And yet, here as always, the substance and the accident have only one being, one and the same existence; therefore they are one. Still, that existence is not the substantial being of the substance, but an accidental being, which comes upon the composite, to multiply it, to intensify it with the different acts and different accidents themselves. The unity of substance and accident is seen to be logically analogous, as the accidents are.

A final consideration will discover, in addition to the faculties which give the being of spontaneity of its action, another "proper" accident which puts it into relation with its surroundings. The theory of indi-

[13] *Ibid.*, 7 ad 1.

viduation by matter has noted the role which matter has to play, inasmuch as it demands quantity. In a manner different from that of the faculties — but still analogously — quantity, in putting a person into space, time, and local movement, situates him in a milieu. Space, time, and movement become a world of relationships, therefore of distinction and conjunction according to circumstances. In this sense they are also a milieu which is intentional in many possible directions. The composite of matter and form necessarily demands quantity, which belongs as necessarily to material being as the faculties to the living thing and to the person. There is a further question, whether movement in space which needs to be directed would not require special faculties.

III. CONTINGENCE AND HISTORY

The different meanings of the word "accident" can be unified and hierarchized: (*a*) that which is neither subject nor substance, but is in a subject; (*b*) that which exists not necessarily, but contingently or by chance; (*c*) "especially in modern usage that whose happening is unfortunate."[14] The place of simple fact and the possibility of contingence are clearly marked, not only in the origin of beings, but also in their existence as a result of circumstances of time and place in which they are and of the events which are thus provoked. The harmful eventualities are expressly mentioned, not as that for which man was made, but as possibilities of bad fortune which it is good to foresee in order to guard against them. The existence of a contingent being, especially of a material being submitted to exterior influences of which it is not master, always risks being contingently affected. Thus, when we were speaking of the transcendentals, evil appeared as something to be avoided, as over against the good which is to be sought.

The remarkable thing about these conclusions is that in justifying for thought the pure fact, becoming, and contingence in being, the dialectic deduces the fact that not everything can be deduced; it limits itself. It finds that it is neither in itself nor for us — far from it — the unique means of information, but that there must be other means like observation, experimentation, and so on — in a word, that over and above the a priori methods there are the a posteriori methods. If we cannot know a priori the characteristics of the things which do, ought to, or can exist except in general — except in large outline and without being able to deduce the infinite variety of essences, individuals, and persons — it remains for us to instruct ourselves by looking outside

[14] André Lalande, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

ourselves at that which is. Since in each being, especially in the living thing and the free agent, not everything can be foreseen, the only way we can be *au courant* with its evolution is to open our eyes. That evolution, instead of being a theorem which unwinds mathematically, is a history which unfolds. With the metaphysical notion of accident and of its varieties, history is altogether justified as a necessity, as a right. If history is intimately dependent upon time, which it needs to unfold itself, it is characteristic of a being situated within uncertainty and matter. By that matter and extension it is situated in space and time. The historical being capable of making history and especially of knowing it as a historian, must be the incarnate spirit, the human person. What is historical is precisely its progress, its becoming, of which it is the author.

This must be well understood. When we admit contingence and history in being and when we recognize that "in itself the place of contingence remains irreducible and eminently characteristic of history,"[15] we do not at all pretend that everything is contingence and that being and spirit are nothing but history. Even when they are subject to becoming, being and consciousness are not deprived of all structure and all nature. Prior to any history, they have a constitution which is withdrawn from contingence and which the whole effort of this *Dialectique de l'Affirmation,* for example, tries to determine. Up to our present point,

> our dialectic is logical, rational . . . (even real); it is not historical. History does not begin except after, or at most with, the positing of consciousness. History, precisely in basing itself, or because it bases itself, on this dialectic, is something different from the dialectic by which the spirit is constituted. History is first the putting into play of the notions which consciousness contains; and that play, the complement of the rational process by which those notions are posited, is again a logic; only it is not all of history; there is in history an element of fact and contingence.[16]

Even though the person has a determined constitution and though

[15] ". . . elle-même cette part de contingence demeure irréductible et excellement caractéristique de l'histoire" (Octave Hamelin, *Essai sur les Eléments Principaux de la Représentation* [Paris: Alcan, 1925], p. 431).

[16] "Notre dialectique est logique, rationnelle . . . . (voire même réelle), elle n'est pas historique. L'histoire ne commence qu'après, ou au plus avec la position de la conscience et l'histoire, tout en se fondant ou parce qu'elle se fonde sur cette dialectique, est autre chose que la dialectique par laquelle l'esprit se constitue. L'histoire est d'abord la mise en jeu des notions qu'enveloppe la conscience et ce jeu, complément du processus rationnel par lequel les notions sont posées, est encore une logique: seulement il n'est pas toute l'histoire: il y a dans l'histoire un élément de fait et contingent" (*ibid.*).

an ideal of being and of spirit is imposed upon it, nevertheless that person, subject to time and matter, notes a play of chance in the possible realizations of the ideal. This puts a chasm between the ideal and reality and permits us to reach the ideal by various paths. There precisely contingence is inserted and with it history. But within that contingence, history and temporal becoming are dominated by laws, because the will should be directed, commanded by the intelligence and the truth. There where the person ought to develop and unify itself,

> the source of unity is everywhere the same by definition and by generation: it is the will. Only, the unity of the person is in a very evident way a construction; it is an edifice achieved by the will with the assistance of the dialectic,[17]

that is to say, with the help of reason. Of myself inasmuch as I am spirit, I can and ought to say, I am that which I wish,[18] provided that I understand, I am that which I ought to wish, because reason imposes this on me, and the truth obliges me, although I can by my liberty try to withdraw myself from them.

Behold the revenge of the dialectic over a domain which it had seemed at first to set free. Laws preside over history, at least over the history of material nature. Ideas direct men as laws govern things. Why, then, should it be absurd to conceive a dialectic of history, which, across the gropings and the retreats, the deviations and the missteps, searches the more or less open and accepted logic which directs the evolution of all societies? Since the person should become more and more spirit and person and since it is always the task of humanity to promote that arrival of spirit in the world, why should it be extravagant to investigate how, in spite of all errors and bad wills, good wills assure the slow establishment of that reign of conscience and reason? Thus controlled according to that which ought to be, the facts will be legitimized or disavowed. Certainly this is not a small enterprise! Perhaps it is impossible for us to bring it entirely to its conclusion; for a spirit like ours, which constructs history while entirely immersed in it, which has at its disposal for its reconstruction only documents which are perishable and almost fatally doomed to disappear — can such a spirit sufficiently dominate history to unify it integrally? The more so because in this world this history is never completed but continues indefinitely! Although complete success seems to be an inaccessible limit, is it not true that partial successes and syntheses can

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 441.
[18] Ch. Secrétan, *La Philosophie de la Liberté* (2eme éd.; Paris: Sandoz et Fischbacher, 1872), p. 365.

be obtained? No matter how tentative they are, are they not worth the labor of trying them? Thus even in their contingence the facts become intelligible.

A still more important matter remains. The analysis of the sublime, which closed the study of the transcendental properties of being, noted that a limited spirit, but one oriented by the idea of being as by its formal object, tends to become really all things. Without at once making precise what this might mean, the analysis noted that movement of our consciousness between the two extremes of the real: the finite which is so little that it seems to be nothing, and the infinite which is all. This has no meaning unless the limited spirit seeks to surpass itself and, as it were, raise itself above itself. The analysis has naturally concluded that this is where the idea of the sublime is introduced, an idea which the German language represents very well by *Erhaben,* to express the fact that it raises us above ourselves. The analysis has also emphasized the paradox that such a condition exists, without understanding how a being can ever be other and more than it is. How can the finite being really surpass itself in freeing itself from the finite, to fix and realize itself in the infinite? How can it be capable of what it cannot do by itself?

We have nevertheless added that if man cannot surpass himself by his own proper means, it would perhaps not be impossible that he be raised above himself in being taken, elevated, by someone to the level of the ideal, rather than that he raise himself. Above what we can do of ourselves, there is perhaps some superior being who can accomplish this of himself in us and so free us from the difficulty.

We have formulated this hypothesis in passing, without delaying on it, neither showing what is natural in it nor making clear how nothing in us demands that it be fulfilled. These further developments have been relegated to a critique of practical reason or to moral philosophy. Nevertheless, let nothing be once and for all rejected as absurd. In order that some being superior to us can raise us above ourselves — if he wishes, and without being constrained, to elevate us to himself — it is an dispensable preliminary that the reality of the world and man is prepared for his coming and his intervention and that these could be events, and even *the event.* Precisely this plane of being, where accidents are added to substance, is that where something can and should *arrive* and where the realization of the ideal depends on historical events, on incidents, on diverse facts. This is, then, something assured, the open door prepared, when we come to treat of fixing the destiny of man.[19]

[19] See Jean Guitton, *Hasard et Valeur* (Actes du IIIeme Congrés des Sociétiés Françaises de Philosophie de Langue Française, 1947), pp. 127ff.

EFFICIENT CAUSALITY IN HUMAN ACTIONS

Marianne Miller Childress

While an examination of the origin of knowledge has been given considerable attention, man as an acting being in the order of appetite has not been as closely scrutinized by contemporary Scholastics. Although we reject as a *deus ex machina* the Cartesian halfhearted attempt to suggest that the body acts on the soul through the pineal gland, many a Thomist might feel some relief if he could reinstate that gland to explain the actions of the soul upon the body. Even on the level of the spiritual interaction of intellect and will, sometimes a naïve description is given comparing the interaction to walking: one takes a step, then another and another, until one's feet join in a leap across a chasm. And this leap is the act of choice. But on the level of ethical thinking a more apt description than this is needed if an explanation of the moral aspects of a human act is to be given. The treatment of the way in which man should act must take into account the nature of the agent and his powers. Ethics must be based on metaphysics and the philosophy of man.

To suggest some problems along this line and to see some of the solutions offered by St. Thomas constitute the main purpose of this paper. First of all, something will be said about human acts as having their source in reason and will. Then some points – by no means all that are possible – will be discussed about the efficient cause of a human act. Then it will be necessary to state in a general way the relation between the moral good and the ontological good.

I. HUMAN ACTS AS HAVING THEIR SOURCE IN REASON AND WILL

It is well known that according to St. Thomas a moral act must be voluntary. That which gives the voluntary a special "type" of good known as the moral good is the factor of freedom in human acts. The problem here is why a human act – that is, a properly human act – involves necessarily an act of the will. After all, is it not his reason that specifies man? And thus is not an intellectual act a truly human

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act? Why bring in the will at all? Now, it is admitted that voluntariness and freedom are based on reason.[1] But one who has reason must also have a will.[2] To say man is a rational animal is to say that he is a being with intellect and will. Just as it is inconceivable to have will without intellect, so also is the reverse true. Though the causality of a particular intellectual act may not involve the will, yet to hold that this implies an act of the rational power which does not and cannot give rise to a volitional act is to misconstrue St. Thomas's metaphysics of intellect. The will act that follows knowledge may not always be free; but nevertheless cognition by its nature gives rise to appetite.

Man is on the way to his end — that is, he is involved in the practical order. Only through appropriate actions can he achieve that end. Thus even the contemplative life in this world is a means to an end and must be ordered by man's will and practical reason. Further, the various means for achieving the end are indeterminate, and so the need for deliberate choice arises. The problem for man is to order his actions towards his end. Even his willing the end will require some practical reasoning and choice insofar as it is necessary for man to discover for himself what constitutes the good which he naturally desires.

Why is the *will* the power which is the efficient principle of human actions? It is necessary to answer this question before it can be seen in what way the will is an efficient principle. Human acts are those which are proper to man as man. But man differs from irrational animals in that he is lord of his acts. Properly human acts are those which proceed from a deliberate will.[3] Further, human acts are those which are directed towards an end. The end is the object of the will. The will is properly the inclination of man. "For if the intellect has an inclination to something, it does not express the inclination of man; it is the will which expresses the inclination of man."[4] In other words, the proper object of the will is directly the good of man, not just the perfection of the potency itself, in such a way that the will attains its object only when man (or at least his soul) attains his end.[5] Hence the will is not only a movement to the end but a movement through the means to that end. Because the will is constituted as an appetitive power it moves the other powers to their proper acts, since

[1] ". . . totius libertatis radix est in ratione constituta" (*De Ver.*, 24. 2).
[2] "Unde in quolibet habente intellectum est voluntas . . ." (*ST*, I. 19. 1).
[3] Cf. *ST*, I-II. 1. 1.
[4] "Intellectus enim si habeat inclinationem in aliquid, non tamen nominat ipsam inclinationem hominis, sed voluntas ipsam inclinationem hominis nominat" (*De Ver.*, 22. 5 ad 3).
[5] Cf. *ST*, I-II. 10. 2.

all particular goods come under the object of the will, the universal good;[6] it moves them in the order of efficient causality. It must be noted here why St. Thomas attributes efficient causality to the will rather than to the intellect. He points out that to move as an agent belongs to the will, for the will is compared to things as they are in themselves, whereas the intellect is related to things as they are spiritually in the soul. Now to act and to be moved pertain to things insofar as they are in the existential order, not inasmuch as they are in the intellect intentionally. For example, the concept of heat does not produce warmth; only the heat can do that. Now, as noted, the will is an inclination. An inclination is the disposition of the mover according to which it moves efficiently. When one power is related to another, it is related to it according to its own properties. Thus when the intellect understands an act of will, it brings into itself the *ratio* of willing. When the will is related to other powers of the soul, it produces an inclination in them and moves each of the powers to operation. Hence the will moves not only exterior things by efficient causality, but also the very powers of the soul.[7] Thus the will is mover precisely because it is an inclination, whereas the intellect is not a moving power in the sense of an efficient agent. The intellect is a cognitive power whose object is to possess things in the intentional order rather than in the order of *esse naturae*. St. Thomas's attribution of efficient causality to the will stems from his understanding of the difference between intellection and appetition. Hence he makes such statements as *moralia a voluntate dependent*.[8]

II. THE WAY IN WHICH THE WILL IS THE EFFICIENT CAUSE OF A HUMAN ACT

A. THE WILL AND THE SUPPOSIT

Since such expressions as "the will's action" and "the intellect's action" occur in this paper, it should be made clear at the beginning that these expressions are really a kind of intellectual shorthand. It is not wholly exact to speak of a power's acting, for it is the individual that acts: ". . . for a potency is not properly said to know or to intend, but the supposit by the potency."[9] That all acts are attributed to the supposit is St. Thomas's way of stressing the unity of the individual.

[6] Cf. *ST*, I. 82. 4 and I-II. 9. 1.
[7] Cf. *De Ver.*, 22. 12.
[8] *CG*, III. 9. Cf. *ST*, III. 19. 2: "Dicendum quod quia homo est id quod est secundum rationem, illa operatio dicitur esse simpliciter humana quae a ratione procedit per voluntatem, quae est rationis appetitus."; *In III Sent.*, 23. 1. 4. 2.; *ST*, I-II. 74. 1.; II-II. 59. 3.
[9] ". . . non enim proprie dicitur cognoscere vel intendere potentia aliqua sed suppositum per potentiam" (*De Ver.*, 22. 13 ad 7).

It will not be possible to understand the way in which the powers of man act upon each other unless it is borne in mind that the powers are only immediate principles of operation, having one foundation, the existing substance. For this reason the actions of the various powers are ordered to each other, for the actions are not so much the perfections of the respective powers as they are the perfections of the supposit. An isolated act of a power, were it to occur, would be a distortion of man and a sort of metaphysical monstrosity. The order of man's powers has not only this teleological aspect, but a formal aspect; that is, man's powers are accidents of his substance, and the actions of these powers are acts ultimately in one subject. Although these actions are all perfections of one substance, however, the various actions are directly referrable to the powers from which they spring.[10] So it is proper to say that a man knows through his intellect, whereas it would never be correct to say that he knows through his will. Finally, it will be seen below that though these powers and their proper acts are distinct, it is a distinction which implies relation.

B. THE WILL AND THE SPECULATIVE INTELLECT

The difficulty presents itself here of finding a mode of exposition that will not involve circular discussion. The source of the trouble is that it is impossible to isolate volitional acts and intellectual acts without being false to the reality of the human act in its complexity. Spiritual actions are not so many disparate acts, proceeding in a temporal sequence; time is involved in the acts of man's rational powers, but only *per accidens*. Nor can a neat label be attached to a particular will act. St. Thomas indicated the difficulty in "separating" or "lining up" these acts.

> Since the acts of the will reflect on themselves, in each act of the will we can find consent and choice and use; so that we may say that the will consents to choose, and consents to consent, and uses itself in consenting and choosing.[11]

On the other hand, some real effort must be made to explain the causality of the will in a human action. Through the course of this explanation it must be kept in mind that it is not possible at each point to modify the statements to the extent that they should be modified. Finally, in order to achieve some unity in this discussion, the following procedure will be observed — an analysis of the acts of intellect and will as they proceed in the psychological series.

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[10] "Dicendum quod accidens per se non potest esse subiectum accidentis. Sed quia etiam in ipsis accidentibus est ordo quidam, subiectum quod est sub uno accidente, intelligitur esse subiectum alterius" (*ST*, I-II. 2 ad 2).
[11] *ST*, I-II. 16. 4 ad 3.

Since the good is the object of the will, the general principle of the will's movement of the intellect is stated by St. Thomas in this way, that the will moves the intellect *per accidens*. This means that the act of understanding is apprehended as a good and thus is desired by the will; and, moved by this desire, the intellect actually understands.[12] This movement is in the order of efficient cause: "Thus the will moves the intellect to operation in the way in which an agent moves."[13] Now two pertinent remarks may be made here. First of all, that which puts the intellect in act is first of all the thing; through the instrumentality of the senses and the principal efficient causality of the agent intellect, knowledge is produced in the intellect. The will is not in this way the efficient cause of the moving of the intellect. The second remark that is relevant is that the will's movement of the intellect can be to an act of the speculative or of the practical intellect — although the will has a special relation to the latter in the order of means, as will be shown below.

So far what has been said is more descriptive of the general relation between intellect and will than of the speculative to the will. It is well to note here the general relation of causality of the intellect on the will: "First and *per se* the intellect moves the will insofar as the will is moved by its object, which is the apprehended good."[14] Thus the intellect is said to move as a final cause.

> In the movement the end is said to move as the reason for the moving. . . . Hence the intellect moves the will in the manner in which the end is said to move inasmuch as it presents the end to the will.[15]

This is not to say that the intellect is the end or final cause of the will's motion, but rather that the end, as in the intentional order, is in the intellect. That is, man, through his intellect, knows the object as desirable for him — a good — and knowing it, he inclines through his will to the possession *(finis quo)* of that object *(finis qui)*. The final cause is the reality as known as desirable; the will's object is the good of the real order. This must be true of any intellect that is not its own good, its own end.

Is the intellect in any other way a cause of the will's act? To answer this, it is necessary to note a distinction St. Thomas makes in regard to the act of the will. The will may have an act *simpliciter* insofar as it tends to its object *absolute*. *Velle* and *amare* are acts of this kind. But it has another kind of act inasmuch as an impression of reason is

[12] Cf. *CG*, III. 26.
[13] *Ibid.*
[14] *Ibid.*
[15] *De Ver.*, 22. 12.

implanted in it. Both acts presuppose an act of reason.[16]

What this impression of reason in the second kind of act is and where it occurs will be shown later. An understanding of the efficient causality of the will in the complexity of the moral act will make clear that the causality of intellect on will is in the order of formal, as well as final, cause.

To take up the problem of the moment, the relation between will and speculative intellect, it must be emphasized that an act of the speculative intellect often involves in this life a previous act of practical intellect. A man may seek truth for a practical purpose. For example, the scientist may desire further scientific knowledge in order to write a book or to improve the material welfare of society. To view an act of understanding in the speculative order as wholly outside, and unrelated to, the moral act is to take an abstract view of the human individual's activities.

The *use* of the speculative intellect really comes under the class of acts known as commanded acts. It is introduced here, however, because certain acts of the speculative intellect will influence the later acts of practical intellect and appetite. The rectitude of the practical intellect involves a conformity with things as understood through the intellect acting speculatively. Since the concern of this paper is the efficient causality of the will, some remarks must be made concerning the general connection between the speculative intellect and the rational appetite. This relation gives rise to many problems, from among which the following choice has been made. Does the will ever move the speculative intellect to an act proper to the latter? Does error in the speculative intellect involve any efficient causality on the part of the will? Does ignorance?

As noted, the will can move the intellect in the order of exercise. But it can move it in another way also, namely, to the determination of its object. This can occur, for example, in an act of faith.

> The will commands the intellect by ordering, not only to the execution of its act but also to the determination of its object: because under the command of the will determining what is to be believed, the intellect assents.[17]

Thus the intellect can assent to the truth of a particular proposition because of the movement of the will. So a man may hold certain things to be true because he wants to, and not because of the intrinsic evidence of the case.

In regard to error, some have held that all intellectual error is due

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[16] *Ibid.*, 13.
[17] *De Virt. in Comm.*, 8.

to the will. Some have even interpreted St. Thomas as holding that the influence of the will is involved in every intellectual error. At least one Thomist maintains that "St. Thomas implies repeatedly what he never quite says in so many words, that every fullfledged mistake involves an influence of free will."[18] That error can involve the activity of the will is quite clearly St. Thomas's teaching; error is in the judgment, but the intellect can judge under the influence of the will. "To dissent, which is the act proper to infidelity, is an act of the intellect as moved by the will, and the same is true of assent."[19] How is this possible? Certain factors must be noted. First, the intellect is not always convinced by the evidence. "Some things which are apprehended do not convince the intellect, although it can assent or dissent or even suspend dissent or assent because of some cause."[20] Secondly, in such instances the will as motive power can move the intellect to act. "And in such things assent or dissent is in our power and is subject to our command."[21]

But this poses a problem. How can the will move the intellect? That is, what reason are we to assign to the will's movement? It would seem obvious that the reason does not in this instance arise from the speculative intellect. St. Thomas remarks that in such an instance the intellect is determined through the will, which chooses to assent to one part; and this is possible precisely because something is sufficient to move the will, although not the intellect.[22] This something may be the grace of God, the influence of the emotions, the influence of previous acts of intention and choice which have impressed an inclination on the will's act in its movement of the speculative intellect, and so forth.

Can it be said, then, that every erroneous judgment involves the activity of the will as influencing cause? If so, it would seem necessary to conclude that error is always deliberate and involves moral evil. This would certainly be an extension of man's freedom and responsibility, but it seems a very rigorous stand to take.

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[18] L. W. Keeler, *The Problem of Error from Plato to Kant* (Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1934), p. 102. Cf. *De Malo*, 3. 7: "*Error* autem est approbare falsa pro veris; unde addit actum quemdam super ignorantiam; potest enim esse ignorantia sine hoc quod aliquis de ignotis sententiam ferat; et tunc ignorans est, et non errans; sed quando iam falsam sententiam fert de his quae nescit, tunc proprie dicitur errare. Et quia peccatum in actu consistit, *error* manifeste habet rationem peccati. Non enim est absque praesumptione, quod aliquis de ignoratis sententiam ferat, et maxime in quibus periculum existit."

[19] *ST*, II-II. 10. 2.

[20] *ST*, I-II. 17. 6.

[21] *Ibid.* In another place St. Thomas speaks of two modes of judging, one *per modum cognitionis* and the other *per modum inclinationis* (*ST*, I. 1. 6 ad 3). However, in this instance the mode of inclination seems to refer to the practical intellect; and the inclination is from the possession of the virtue of prudence, rather than from an appetitive inclination.

[22] Cf. *De Ver.*, 14. 1.

Ignorance as related to the moral act poses a much greater problem on the level of the practical intellect than on that of the speculative. There will be a treatment below of one aspect of this problem, ignorance in relation to conscience and counsel. But obviously there can be an ignorance of truth in the speculative intellect which will bear a relation to the moral act. It is well known that St. Thomas admits that ignorance of a circumstance may have some definite influence on the morality of an act. (Here it is necessary to distinguish between not knowing that a thing is so, and thinking that it is other than it is, for the latter is error; the difficulty is that, in the concrete, ignorance frequently gives rise to error.) This ignorance in regard to truth can involve moral evil, when one is ignorant about what can and should be known.[23] This involves negligence[24] and will be discussed in connection with the problem of nonwilling as voluntary.

C. THE WILL AND THE PRACTICAL INTELLECT IN GENERAL

Through the habit of synderesis the practical intellect is able to know that good is to be done and evil avoided. This will be a principle throughout the whole series of moral acts. Thus the practical intellect has a direct relation to the activity of the will. St. Thomas makes this distinction between the speculative and the practical: "The speculative reason and the practical reason differ in this: the speculative is only apprehensive of things but the practical is not only apprehensive, but causative."[25] Since the practical intellect is "that which directs what is apprehended to operation"[26] it has a *per se* relation to appetite, whereas the speculative intellect is only related to will *per accidens*. Because of this the human will has a special order to practical reason, which order influences its efficient causing of the human act.

It is necessary to consider, as well, the influence of the will on practical intellect. A certain indeterminateness on the part of the intellect and the fact that the will, as in act, can *moveri ex se* are the roots of human freedom. These two factors are basic to the self-determination that is involved in the act of choice and even in earlier acts. These are points which will be considered in more detail in the analysis of the various particular acts of each power.

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[23] Cf. *ST*, I-II. 74. 5.
[24] *Ibid.*, 84. 4 ad 4.
[25] *ST*, II-II. 83. 1.
[26] *ST*, I. 79. 11.

D. THE WILL IN THE ORDER OF END

1. WILLING THE END

The motion of the will to the end is not called intention, but simply *velle*, "to will."[27] There is a primal act of the will distinct from intention and the acts following intention.

> It is evident that the will is moved by one and the same movement to the end, as the reason for willing the means, and to the means themselves. [This is the act of intention.] But it is another act by which the will is moved to the end absolutely.[28]

The nature of this *velle* must be made clear, for it will be the source of all the future acts of the will.

The meaning of the "willing of the end" seems to be one of the most difficult questions that is discussed throughout this paper. Of the many questions that may be asked on this point, the following are of particular interest: (*a*) Is willing the end a necessary act? (*b*) In what way is it a caused act? (*c*) Is there any sense in which it can be a free act? (*d*) What relation does it have to subsequent acts of the will?

As indicated, St. Thomas teaches that the movement of the will to the end is a distinct act of the will, distinct at least in some way even from intention. It is also quite clearly his teaching that willing the end is a necessary act, not a free act. It is a voluntary act, not a coerced act; but since the will is naturally determined to its object, willing the good is an action proportionate to the will as will. It is not an act which a man is free to place or not once the good has been presented by the intellect. "The will must of necessity adhere to the last end, which is happiness."[29] This is a natural movement of the will.[30] Now it seems quite clear that this movement of the will must be distinct from the will itself as a power of the soul, and for two reasons. First of all, actions are distinct from powers in a finite being, and this distinction implies a transcendental relation of act to potency. Secondly, the act of willing the end presupposes an act of the intellect,[31] but certainly the existence of the will as a power of the soul requires no such previous actuation on the part of the intellect.

Now this movement of the will to the good in general as grasped by intellect is a certain inchoative act, in that it is not a determinate inclination to any specified object. But, it may be asked, can there be

[27] Cf. *De Ver.*, 22. 14.
[28] *ST*, I-II. 8. 3. Cf. *De Ver.*, 22. 13.
[29] *ST*, I. 82. 1. Cf. *De Ver.*, 22. 5.
[30] Cf. *ST*, I-II. 10. 1.
[31] Cf. *De Ver.*. 22. 13.

such a movement of so general and unspecified a nature? The answer is in the affirmative, although it is admitted that the will cannot long remain in such a state of relative indetermination. Nevertheless, the intellect can have a notion of the good in general — which in an individual man may mean merely a general notion of happiness — which can arouse in the will a desire for happiness. It is necessary to place this act first, because from it will stem other more determined acts of the practical intellect and the will. One can know generally that "it is good for me to be happy" and can desire that happiness without specifying at the same time (that is, in the same act) in what that happiness consists. In fact, one may respecify the inclination many times during a lifetime. Again, one may be in doubt as to what happiness is and how it is to be achieved, without losing the recognition that happiness is good and without ceasing to desire it. In other words, this general inclination can become more determinate, but only through reflection involving other acts of will and intellect.

Now it will be obvious from the above that the act under discussion is that of the willing of the ultimate end, and it is in this sense that *velle* will be treated throughout the remaining questions of this subsection. For willing a particular end may have a certain necessity; but its necessity derives from the choice of a particular means in an earlier act, which in turn may become an end in relation to other means ordered to it. Such an end is only relatively an end and poses no special problem. The willing of a particular end can be a result of an *imperium* and thus assume the character of a commanded act.

With this view of the act of willing the end, it may be asked, next, in what way it is a caused act. St. Thomas holds that the efficient cause of such an act can only be God himself.[32] But in what way is God the cause of the will's movement? Only in the same way that he acts with every secondary agent. Or is it that he directly actuates the will, that is, educes it from potency to act? To answer this a decision must be made as to what kind of power the will is. Generally the various powers of man are considered as falling into two classes: powers which must be put in act in order to act, such as the possible intellect; and powers that are in act from the beginning, such as the vegetative powers and the agent intellect. St. Thomas calls a power of the latter kind a *virtus*. To which class does the human will belong? Now, St. Thomas does not agree with St. Bonaventure's placing a *pondus* in the will, distinct from it and inclining it to the good.[33] Nor

[32] Cf. *ST*, I-II. 9. 6.

[33] Cf. M. L. Martinez, R.S.C.J., *Recta Ratio according to St. Thomas Aquinas* (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Philosophy, Saint Louis University, 1950), p. 122, for a discussion on this aspect of the nature of the will.

will he admit the existence of an agent will. Perhaps the will can be described as a *virtus*. The more usual conclusion is to hold that the will is a passive potency.[34] However this question is answered, it remains that the will, even when actuated in the order of exercise, is still indeterminate in the order of specification.

According to Father Lonergan[35] it was only in his later works that St. Thomas developed the distinction between the specification of, and the exercise of, the act of the will; according to him, this clarification was due to the challenge offered by the Parisian Averroists with their doctrine of determinism.[36] St. Thomas transcends four stages in developing his theory of the will and its freedom.[37] These were (*a*) that *liberum arbitrium* was a faculty; (*b*) that even the use of the term was necessary in the *Prima Secundae*; (*c*) that noncoercion is the same as freedom; and (*d*) that will is a passive potency. (It is this last point which is of interest here.) In the *De Veritate* and the *Pars Prima,* Father Lonergan continues, St. Thomas speaks of the act of appetition as passive; but in the *De Malo* and the *Prima Secundae* St. Thomas conceived of the distinction between specification and exercise. The specification is caused by the intellect; the exercise is the self-motion of the will; and this self-motion involves a first mover acting on the will itself.[38]

Now this distinction of specification and exercise is important on the level of the end as well as means. Whether or not St. Thomas conceived the will as passive in his earlier works in the way in which Father Lonergan interprets them,[39] it is evident that in his later works, the notion of the intellect as specifying the will's act is carefully explained. The type of causality the practical intellect has on the will is that of specification, that is, informing the will's act, specifying the

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[34] Cf. G. Klubertanz, S.J., *Notes on the Philosophy of Human Nature* (Saint Louis: Saint Louis Univ. Press, 1949), p. 72.

[35] B. Lonergan, S.J., "St. Thomas' Thought on *Gratia Operans*," *Theological Studies,* III (1942), pp. 533-78.

[36] Cf. D. O. Lottin, "Liberté humaine et motion divine," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale,* VII (1935), pp. 52-69. This study was used by Father Lonergan, who expands Father Lottin's treatment.

[37] Cf. Lonergan, *op. cit.,* p. 533.

[38] Cf. *ibid.,* pp. 534-35.

[39] This interpretation is open to question, because even as early as the *De Veritate* the distinction is made between the intellect's motion in the order of finality and the will's in the order of efficiency. Whereas Father Lonergan treats the final cause much as if it were an efficient cause, a careful reading of the questions referring to the will in the *De Veritate* does not seem to indicate that this was St. Thomas's position. Furthermore, St. Thomas does not discard the distinction of efficient and final causality of the will's acts in his later works, although it is quite true he clarifies the specifying function of intellect. Furthermore Father Lonergan tends to take the passivity of the patient as related to agent and that of agent as related to end as univocal, whereas it is clearly analogous.

act to be an actual inclination to this or that good.

> The object moves by determining the act, after the manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things actions are specified, as heating by heat. Now the first formal principle is universal *being* and *truth*, which is the object of the intellect. And therefore by this kind of motion the intellect moves the will as presenting its object to it.[40]

But it is not the speculative intellect that specifies the will's inclination directly; rather it is the practical intellect.

> Just as the imagination does not move the sensitive appetite, so neither does the apprehension of the true without the aspect of goodness and desirability. Hence it is not the speculative intellect that moves, but the practical intellect.[41]

It is in this way, then, that the intellect causes the will's motion, not efficiently but through specification.

> The practical intellect is a motive power, not as exciting movement, but as directing towards it; and this belongs to it according to its mode of apprehension.[42]

This "order to reason" which implies a formal causality of intellect on the will is more clearly evident in the acts consequent to *velle* — that is, from intention on. But even in the order of end the intellect "informs" the will act when it is a question of willing a specified end. This introduces the next question: Is there any freedom in the order of end when it is a matter of willing the ultimate end?

Contemporary existentialists maintain that man's freedom lies primarily in the choice of ends, not means; to hold that there are absolute values and that man is determined to a good is, according to them, to assume an unauthentic position, to be in bad faith. To the Thomist, at first sight, this seems to be a complete misunderstanding of what man is and how he acts. In some respects this judgment is true, insofar as the existentialist rejects man's objective ordination to his end. In another way, though, even the Thomist can agree with part of the statement. There is no choice of the end, it is true; but there is a choice in regard to our determining in what that end consists. St. Thomas makes this quite evident in answering the question whether or not man's willing of the end can be meritorious, for if it is meritorious it will be so because it is free in some way. Because of his nature, man has an appetition for the ultimate end in general, so that he naturally desires to be perfected in goodness. But in what this

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[40] *ST*, I-II. 9. 1.
[41] *Ibid.*, ad 2.
[42] *ST*, I. 79. 11 ad 1.

completion or perfection of his nature consists – whether in virtues or knowledge or pleasure or some other thing – this is not determined for him by his nature in the sense that he always knows what it is and necessarily wills it. When, therefore, with the help of divine grace, a man apprehends as his end this special good in which his true beatitude is to be found, he merits, not because he naturally desires happiness, but because he desires this special good, namely the beatific vision, in which his true happiness lies. Therefore if someone erroneously desires some particular good as his happiness – for example, material pleasures – he incurs guilt, not because he desires happiness, but because he wrongly desires as his happiness that in which his true beatitude is not to be found.[43]

This indetermination requires, then, that a person should discover in what his happiness consists and that he should order his acts to it. It is in this sense, then, that a man chooses his end. This choice, of course, involves reasoning in the practical order and so requires the proper use of reason, which comes under the efficient moving of the will. In fact St. Thomas says that one cannot reach the age of reason and not specify what that last end is. In answering the question whether the first sin of an unbaptized person is mortal or venial, St. Thomas throws some light on this "choice of the end."

> It is impossible for venial sin to be in anyone with original sin alone, and without mortal sin. The reason for this is that, before a man comes to the age of reason, the lack of years hinders the use of reason and excuses him from mortal sin. Hence much more does it excuse him from venial sin, if he does anything which is such generically. But when he begins to have the use of reason, he is not entirely excused from the guilt of venial or mortal sin. Now the first thing that occurs to a man to think about then is to deliberate about himself. And if he directs himself to the due end, he will by means of grace receive the remission of original sin, whereas if he does not direct himself to the due end, as far as he is capable of discretion at that particular age, he will sin mortally, through not doing that which is in his power to do.[44]

In this sense, then, the willing of the end is free and a moral act for which one is responsible. Whatever an individual makes his "project," as the existentialist would call it, will play a controlling role in his future voluntary acts, for all that man wills, he wills on account of

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[43] Cf. *De Ver.*, 22. 8.
[44] *ST*, I-II. 89. 6.

the ultimate end.[45] This introduces the consideration of the act of will known as intention.

2. INTENDING THE END

It is because man knows the end and the human will moves itself in the order of exercise that his acts are said to be voluntary.[46] From willing the end man moves himself to will the means. The act of intention is between the order of end and that of means; it is directed to the end, but it bears a relation to the means that the simple act of *velle* does not.

> The will may consider the end as the term towards which something is ordered; and thus intention regards the end. For when we speak of intending to have health, we mean not only that we will to have it, but that we will to reach it by means of something else.[47]

Here, just as in the previous act of *velle,* an act of the intellect ordering something to the end is presupposed.[48] But this act of intention is not simply a willing of the means; it is rather a willing of the means on account of the end — "the will is moved to that which is for the end on account of the end."[49] But precisely what does this mean? Is not even the act of choice an act of willing a means on account of the end? St. Thomas would not identify intention and election:

> . . . intention is an act of the will related to reason as ordering those things which are for the end to the end itself; but election is an act of the will related to reason as comparing those things which are for the end among themselves, and thus intention and election are different.[50]

Now it seems that what St. Thomas means when he speaks of intention as an act of intending the means on account of the end, is that intention is first of all an inclination to the end through some means, which means have not as yet been specifically determined. In other words, the intellect judges that the end is attainable and there is "some way" in which it can be possessed; and the will inclines to the end as attainable. Secondly, intention is related to the means insofar as the will by intending the end moves the intellect to discover the means, which will be chosen. In this latter sense, election is an "overflowing" of the act of intention and is at the same time a continuation of the inclination initiated by the will in the act of intention.

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[45] Cf. *ST,* I-II. 1. 6.
[46] "Unde cum homo maxime cognoscat finem sui operis et moveat seipsum, in eius actibus maxime voluntarium invenitur" (*ST,* I-II. 1. 1).
[47] *ST,* I-II. 12. 1 ad 4.
[48] Cf. *ibid.,* ad 3.
[49] *Ibid.,* 4.
[50] *De Ver.,* 22. 13 ad 16. Cf. *ST,* I-II. 12. 4 ad 3.

In order to achieve the end, the will – willing the end – moves the intellect to consider whether the end is attainable; if the practical intellect judges that the desired end is attainable, this judgment affects the will and specifies the act of intending. The problem here is to see in what way the intellect is "causing" the intention. It is necessary to recall a text indirectly referred to earlier.

> The will can have two kinds of acts. One belongs to it according to its own nature, inasmuch as it tends to its proper object *absolutely*; and this act is attributed to the will *simpliciter*, (and thus to will and to love are attributed) even though this kind of act presupposes an act of reason. The will has another kind of act, which belongs to it inasmuch as an impression of reason remains in the will. Now as it is the proper function of reason to order and to compare, whenever there appears in the act of the will some comparison or ordination, such an act will be the will's *not absolutely*, but as ordered to reason. It is in this latter way that the act of intending is an act of the will; for to intend is nothing other than to direct that which is willed to another as to an end. And thus to intend differs from to will, because to will is a tendency into the end absolutely: but intention implies *order to the end*, inasmuch as the end is that to which those things *which are for the end* are ordered.[51]

To understand the mode of efficient causality attributed to the will in the human act, it is essential that one grasp the concrete relation that obtains between the will and reason. It is not sufficient to dismiss this with the distinction between specification and exercise. For this is precisely the issue – to discover what is meant by specification and to clarify in what way the will has freedom of exercise. This relation of intellect and will persists through the whole moral act, but it becomes crucial at three points: the intention, the choice, and the command. It would be possible to study it at any one of these three stages; but, according to the order of problem presentation adopted, it is well to consider it in detail here in connection with the act of intention.[52]

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[51] *De Ver.*, 22. 13. The rest of the text is also worth noting: "Cum enim voluntas moveatur in suum obiectum sibi propositum a ratione, diversimode movetur, secundum quod diversimode sibi proponitur. Unde, cum ratio proponit sibi aliquid ut *absolute bonum*, voluntas movetur in illud *absolute*; et hoc est velle. Cum autem proponit sibi aliquid sub ratione boni, ad quod alia ordinentur ut ad finem, tunc tendit in illud *cum quodam ordine*, qui invenitur in actu voluntatis, non secundum propriam naturam, sed secundum exigentiam rationis. Et ita intendere est actus voluntatis in ordine ad rationem." This terminology of will as receiving an impression from reason is not restricted to St. Thomas's earlier writings; we find it occurring in the *Prima Secundae* – see, for example, 60. 1.

[52] Father Klubertanz has studied this relation as it obtains in the acts of *imperium* and choice. Cf. "The Unity of Human Activity," THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXVII (January, 1950), pp. 89-102.

To order is an act of reason rather than appetite.[53] But why and in what way is ordering an act of reason? In answer, something must be said about the complex notion of "order." Passively an order is something to be followed; actively, though, order is a relating of one thing to another. Now, to relate one thing to another means to discover or to see such an order of relation among them. But this is obviously an act in the realm of knowledge. Thus the relationship between things may be a real one, but the recognition of this relation is an act of cognition. The intellect of man, not the appetite, is his cognitive faculty. Hence it is his reason that "puts things in order" in the intentional order, although it is through his will that he will effectuate certain moral actions as ordered to an end. It is in this way, then, that to order is an act of reason. Throughout this discussion, however, it must be kept in mind that the meaning of order always directly implies *relation* — either relation as conceived by reason, or the real relation as it is between things. (These are not mutually exclusive, of course.) The relating in the intentional order is the work of reason; the relating in the real order is the work of will. These two are not separated, but are inseparably conjoined. The problem is to see how they are so connected.

St. Thomas describes a properly human operation as one *quae a ratione procedit per voluntatem*.[54] Now, this is a question of immanent actions, not transient actions.[55] One should not look for "products" of these acts of intellect and will; that is, these powers are not agents acting upon patients; but they are powers of man ordered to him and to each other by their very metaphysical structure. St. Thomas says:

> When the acts of two powers are ordered to one another, in each of them is something belonging to the other power; and thus each act can be denominated from either power. Now it is evident that the act of reason directing those things which are for the end, and the act of the will tending to these according to the direction of reason, are ordered to one another.[56]

Here the order is one of a real relation, not one as discovered by reason. But it is precisely because of this real relation that the order of means to an end discovered by reason affects the inclination of the will. So "because the perfection of the preceding act remains in the act that follows, it happens sometimes that there is an act of the will

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[53] Cf. *ST*, I-II. 12. 1 ad 3.
[54] *ST*, III. 19. 2.
[55] "Quidam vero actus sunt non transeuntes in exteriorem materiam, sed manentes in agente, sicut appetere et cognoscere" (*ST*, I-II. 74. 1). Cf. *ibid.*, ad 2.
[56] *ST*, I-II. 14. 1 ad 1.

insofar as it retains in itself something of the act of reason."[57]

But what is it in reason that "remains" in the act of the will called intention? It is the order discovered by reason in its judgment of the attainability of the end:

> The will does not order, but tends to something according to the order of reason. Thus this term intention designates an act of the will, presupposing the ordination of reason ordering something to the end.[58]

Hence the act of the intellect *informs* the act of the will.[59] It is in this way that the rational appetite receives the impression of reason. "But the appetite does not receive the impression univocally, so to say, because it is not made rational in its essence, but through participation."[60] The act of the will does not become an act of knowledge; rather its act is a reasonable inclination under the impress of reason. It is a reasonable inclination as *related* to a due end. St. Thomas makes this clear in a statement in the *De Veritate.*

> . . . relation to the end actively pertains to reason, the function of which is to refer to the end; but relation passively can be found in anything directed or related to the end by reason. And such can be found in the will. In this way relation to the end pertains to intention.[61]

Now this use of terminology – *activa et passiva* – should not lead one to think that St. Thomas is speaking of this particular relationship between intellect and will as one of agent and patient in the order of efficient causality. For the intellect is not a mover as agent, as has been indicated above. All movement as efficient cause is from the will. If one seeks for an analogy to describe this relationship of intellect to will, one will find a more apt one in the form-matter relationship.

In the *Prima Secundae,* question 13, article 1, St. Thomas describes the act of choice as materially an act of will and formally an act of intellect. He does not appear to use this terminology in respect to the act of intending. However, it seems legitimate to extend it to this act. He says:

> Now we must observe, as regards the acts of the soul, that an act belonging essentially to some power or habit receives its form or species from a higher power or habit, according as the inferior is ordered by the superior. . . . Now it is evident that, in a sense, reason precedes the

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[57] *ST,* I-II. 17. 1. Here St. Thomas is describing *imperium,* but we can apply this principle to the act of intention.
[58] *ST,* I-II. 12. 1 ad 3.
[59] Cf. *ST,* I-II. 9. 1.
[60] *ST,* I-II. 60. 1.
[61] *Ibid.,* 22. 13 ad 4.

> will and directs its acts, namely, insofar as the will tends to its object according to the order of reason: for the apprehensive power presents to the appetite its object. Accordingly, that act whereby the will tends to something proposed to it as being good, through being ordained to the end by the reason, is materially an act of the will, but formally an act of the reason. Now in such matters, the substance of the act is the matter in comparison to the order imposed by the higher power.

But in what precise sense does the intellect *inform* the will's act? Each of these powers can inform the act of the other.

> The will moves the intellect by commanding its act, and the reason moves the will by proposing its object to it, which is the end; hence each power can be informed by the other.[62]

In regard to the will's informing the act of the intellect something has been said above, and more will be added later. That this *information* is in the order of efficient causality will be demonstrated in greater detail below. Here the concern is primarily with the intellect's informing the act of the will. One is tempted to speak of this in terms of principal-instrumental causality. St. Thomas uses this explanation frequently in his analysis of the relation of the will to the commanded act. However, it is not legitimate to extend it to intention, because principal-instrument has its primary significance in the order of efficient causes; and it is precisely not a relation of efficient causes that obtains in this act of intention.

The ordering of the will's act involves some type of causality.[63] It is not that of efficiency, for God is the only one who moves the will efficiently. Furthermore, the ordering is from the intellect, and the intellect as such is not an efficient cause (except of its own *verbum*). Nor can the intellect's notion of order be merely an exemplary cause of the will's movement, for the exemplar is imitated as known, whereas the rational appetite is not a cognitive power. Nor will final causality suffice. The will is not merely seeking an end, it is seeking an end *in a certain way*; the apprehension of the end elicits the will's act of *velle* or *fruitio* — depending on whether the end is simply desired, or possessed and enjoyed — not the act of intention. As the intellect's causality is in the order of specification, the intellect is not a material cause, but a formal cause, of the will's specified inclination.

But in what way is the intellect in act a formal cause of the will's action? Father Renard in describing the act of choice says this:

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[62] *De Ver.*, 24. 6 ad 5.

[63] Cf. Klubertanz, *op. cit.*, p. 97, where he makes a similar analysis in regard to the act of choice.

> . . . their causality [that of intellect and will] is *mutual*, that is, they act upon each other simultaneously. For this reason their causality may be analogously compared to that of matter and form. Like matter and form they act simultaneously and reciprocally. There is, however, this important difference. Matter and form are *intrinsic* material and formal causes. Now, while the influence of the intellect upon the will as it elicits the act of choice is that of a *formal extrinsic* cause; the will on the contrary acts in the order of efficient causality . . .[64]

If one substitutes intention for choice for the present purpose, what Father Renard is saying is that the intellect is an extrinsic formal cause when the intellect and will are related in an act as form and matter. Also speaking about choice, Father Klubertanz says that the determination by the intellect is an intrinsic formal cause.[65]

Now it would seem that an extrinsic formal cause would be an exemplar, although what Father Renard probably means is that the act of the intellect is not *in* the very act of the will; and with this there could be agreement. On the other hand, Father Klubertanz does not fully indicate why and in what way the intellect's act is an intrinsic formal cause. (The referrent is not clearly indicated by either author.) As intrinsic formal cause the intellectual act would seem to be a specifying of the intellectual power rather than of another power. Part of this difficulty arises from a consideration of the formal-material relation substantially and an attempt to transfer this notion univocally to the intellect-will activities. Instead of saying that the act of the intellect is in the act of the will as a form, one might express it better by saying that there is a real relation in the act of the will to the act of the intellect ordering things to an end. That is, the intellect's impression on the will is that of establishing in the will's inclination a relation of order so that the inclination is a tendency to a specified object in a specified way. This relation does not arise from any efficient action of intellect on will; it has its ultimate foundation in that the powers are, in their metaphysical structure, ordered (related) to each other; its immediate foundation is that the intellect in act — as concerned with the good to be done — causes a real relation in the will inclining it to that good. That is, the act of the intellect has a twofold relation; one to the power of the intellect as principate to principle, and the other to the act of the will which is ordered by it.[66]

[64] H. Renard, *The Philosophy of Man* (Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1948), p. 189.
[65] *Op. cit.*, p. 101.
[66] Perhaps we could present this schematically in this fashion:



(1) Relation of the judgment to its principle
(2) Relation of the intellect in act to the will

If this latter ordering is to be called an intrinsic formal cause because the act of the intellect by its very nature gives rise to this relation in the will, there will be no objection as long as we are careful not to take this to mean that the act of cognition is in the will formally as an act of cognition. The will is not a cognitive power capable of making a judgment.

This long discussion of the way in which the intellect informs the will was necessary in order to explain the efficient causality of the will in the order of the means, for the will's activity in future acts will include this relation of reason established in the intention. The act of intention is the mainspring for the will's movement of the reason in counseling and for the acts of choice and command. The will as intending the end moves the intellect to consider what are the means by which the end can be achieved; and from this consideration will come the act of choice. It is in this way that intention is the principle cause of the moral act.

Two last points in regard to intention need to be considered. The first of these is whether the act of intention is a free act. As St. Thomas uses the term *intention,* it can designate either the intention of the last end or the intention of some particular end. In regard to the latter there is no great difficulty. The intending of a particular end presupposes that this end has been previously chosen as a means, although it is now considered as an end to which something else is ordered. As this earlier act of choice was free and a moral act, so also the consequent acts of intellect and will are really, from this point of view, commanded acts and thus moral acts. And certainly freedom of exercise persists throughout these commanded acts, although freedom of specification may not arise until a later act of choice is made following this present intention. In regard to the intention of the last end, intending seems to follow with the same kind of necessity as *velle.* If it is a question of willing the end as consisting in God or pleasure or wealth, and so on, then the intending of that end will be a moral act in the same way in which the specified willing of that end is.

The second problem pertinent here is that of habitual or virtual intention. An intention can persist throughout a series of acts. In answer to an objection that man does not do everything on account of the last end, St. Thomas remarks that it is not necessary that someone always think of the ultimate end which he desires or does something for; but the perfection (*virtus*) of the first intention, which regards the ultimate end, remains in the desire of anything else, even if the ultimate end is not actually considered. Thus it is not necessary that one who walks down a path take thought of the end as each step

is taken.[67] Father Klubertanz remarks:

> There is such a thing as a continuing influence of the will, which is called a virtual intention. The virtual intention is something like a habit, something like a retained intelligible species. It differs from a habit in that it is an exercise of causality, and so is the continuation of an act in a somewhat reduced state.[68]

The intention is not a habit, nor, as an act of will, is it an intelligible species. How does its influence remain throughout further acts? The will is mover of itself in the order of means, so that as intending the end it moves itself to the means. But the order in intention remains in the future acts, for it is precisely as an ordered mover that the will is the efficient cause of its own movements as well as of other powers. The will as intending is the principle of the will as choosing, which is the principate. This order in the intention, indeed, must persist throughout the series of acts following it.[69] As a final word on intention, we may note that the good intention does not solve all moral problems; but without it, on the other hand, they will never be solved rightly.

E. THE WILL IN THE ORDER OF MEANS

1. THE WILL, THE ACT OF COUNSELLING, AND THE JUDGMENT OF CONSCIENCE

> In counsel, which is an act of reason, there appears something of will, as the matter thereof, for counsel is about the things which man wills to do, and also as the moving cause, because from this that a man wills an end, he is moved to take counsel about those things which are for the end.[70]

Since the will is the principle of efficient movement, as willing the end it moves the intellect to consider the means. This consideration of the means is the inquiry of counsel which terminates in the judgment of counsel. The will is related to this inquiry in two ways: first of all as mover and secondly as "matter about which" (since counsel is preparatory to choice, which will be materially an act of will). As mover the will moves as intending the end, that is, as related to intellect as presenting the end as desirable and attainable. Hence the will's movement is not a blind fiat, but an ordered movement, in which the practical intellect is as patient. This inquiry of reason, then, is not a separate enterprise indulged in by the intellect alone, but is a directed inquiry, with the will as agent.

There is much that could be developed concerning the act of taking

[67] Cf. *ST*, I-II. 1. 6 ad 3.
[68] *Notes on the Philosophy of Human Nature*, p. 90.
[69] It seems that the only way in which the original intention could completely lose its efficacy would be for the will to intend another end.
[70] *ST*, I-II. 14. 1 ad 1.

counsel. Since the problem here is the efficient causality of the human act and its relation to morality, the one aspect which seems most relevant is that of conscience. What relation does conscience have to counsel and the movement of the will?

Mother Mary Louise Martinez in her doctoral dissertation identifies the judgment of conscience with the judgment of counsel, and she criticizes Father Lottin for trying to place the two in separate series.

> But some say that conscience is an act judging of the moral quality of some deed or other, while the judgment of counsel is purely psychological, simply indicating means to an end, without reference to the moral quality of the act. To this it may be answered that St. Thomas describes conscience also in psychological terms, and that, moreover, as the order of the voluntary is the moral order it is hardly possible to place a full-fledged human act without some recognition of its human value.[71]

Now, in taking counsel the individual is concerned with what it is good for him to do. The conclusion of this inquiry is, This should be done. Psychologically, the person must act for what he considers his own good – that is, what appears to him as good for him. The morally evil is that which is against, or contrary to, his nature in the concrete (thus eating meat on Friday for the Catholic is against his nature as elevated to the state of grace and as a member of the Church to whose command he owes obedience); and as long as it is thus viewed, one can never decide it is good to do, let alone choose to do it.

If what appears to be a moral good is really such, there is no problem. But what of an erroneous judgment of counsel? Is this to be identified with conscience? If so, it would seem that every morally evil act involves an erroneous conscience; for certainly every moral act requires that the action be judged as good before it is chosen. But do not men sometimes recognize that they are acting against conscience? Furthermore, St. Thomas says quite clearly that the judgment of election may be perverted, whereas the judgment of conscience remains intact.[72] It would seem, then, that the identification of the judgment of counsel with that of conscience is not legitimate.

The answer to this lies in the recognition of the fact that an individual can perform several inquiries and reach successive judgments of counsel before any choice is made. And whereas the first judgment

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[71] *Op. cit.*, p. 301. Sometime earlier I had attempted to place the judgment within the inquiry of counsel without identifying it with the judgment of counsel. This effort was not wholly successful. Cf. "The Prudential Judgment," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, XXII (1947), p. 150.

[72] Cf. *De Ver.*, 17. 1 ad 4.

may have true rectitude, the second may not. St. Thomas gives an illustration of the reasoning of the temperate, the intemperate, the continent, and the incontinent.[73] While the truly temperate man will need only one judgment of counsel (which is, at least virtually, a true judgment of conscience) — and the intemperate, as directing himself solely to pleasure, will need only one also — the continent and the incontinent waver. The last two recognize the evil act as sinful (this first judgment is the judgment of counsel and an act of conscience); but each formulates a second judgment (the continent, that the evil act is not to be done; the incontinent, that the pleasurable good is to be sought).

The judgments of counsel are reached by the reasoning of the cognitive power as influenced by the efficient causality of the will, and by the sense appetites as well. But the movement of the sense appetites is subject to the will, as will be explained below. Hence the efficient causality of the will plays a central role in the formation of the judgment of conscience. Furthermore, what a man does not consider in deliberation is imputable to him. But how can a failure to will to consider something be voluntary and moral?

St. Thomas enunciates the principle that the not-to-will may be called voluntary, insofar as man has it in his power to will and not to will.[74] When one wills not to act there is, of course, the elicited act of the will; and the will is the cause of a refusal to act. In the latter instance, it is necessary to posit some act of the will in regard to the causes or occasions of the failure to will.[75] If the cause or occasion be subject to the will, the omission is voluntary; and such a cause, insofar as it is voluntary, must always include some act, at least the interior act of the will.

The same principle can be applied to the problem of an ignorance which is vincible and culpable. Where there is vincible ignorance, there is negligence attributable to the will.[76] However, that an only apparent good should be viewed as a real good is not attributable always to ignorance, for sometimes it is due to the ignoring of the evil aspects of an act.[77]

Much more could be said about ignorance and its causes as influencing counsel, about the formation of virtues, and about the influence of the passions. However, it will suffice here to summarize what has been established about counsel. First, it is an act of practical

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[73] *De Malo*, 3. 9 ad 7.
[74] *ST*, I-II. 71. 5 ad 2.
[75] Cf. *ibid.*, 5.
[76] Cf. *ST*, I-II. 84. 4 ad 5.
[77] Cf. *De Malo*, 3. 9 ad 4. Cf. 2. 3 ad 9.

reason moved by the will intending the end; secondly, this influence of will persists throughout the inquiry and the judgment (s) of counsel; thirdly, the judgment of counsel can include the act of conscience, and so the efficient causality of the will is involved in the very judgment of conscience; fourthly, if the reason is ignorant about some pertinent factor, or if reason fails to consider what should be considered, this is attributable to the efficient causality of the will, both as failing to move reason properly here and now and as moving reason or some other power to an act contrary to the perfection of the act of counseling.

2. THE ACT OF CHOICE

In the *De Veritate* St. Thomas speaks frequently of *liberum arbitrium* and *iudicium electionis.* In the *Prima Secundae,* however, he uses the term *electio* and describes the act of choice as materially or substantially an act of will and formally an act of intellect. The indetermination in regard to the means to a certain end is the root of freedom on the side of reason; the will's actuation in the order of exercise is the root of freedom on the side of appetite. The judgment of election is not to be identified with the judgment of counsel. Counsel terminates in a judgment, "This is something to be done," whereas election involves the judgment "I choose to do this." This latter judgment of election is the climax of the free act.

> Man does not choose of necessity. And this is because that which is possible not to be, is not of necessity. Now the reason why it is possible not to choose, or to choose, may be gathered from a twofold power in man. For man can will and not will, act and not act; and again, he can will this or that, and do this or that. The reason for this is to be found in the very power of the reason. For the will can tend to whatever the reason can apprehend as good. Now the reason can apprehend as good not only this, viz., *to will or to act,* but also this, viz., *not to will* and *not to act.* Again, in all particular goods, the reason can consider the nature of some good and the lack of some good, which has the nature of an evil; and in this way it can apprehend any single one of such goods as to be chosen or to be avoided. The perfect good alone, which is happiness, cannot be apprehended by the reason as an evil or as lacking in any way. Consequently, man wills happiness of necessity, nor can he will not to be happy or to be unhappy. Now since choice is not of the end, but of the means . . . it is not of the perfect good, which is happiness, but of other and particular goods. Therefore, man chooses, not of necessity, but freely.[78]

[78] *ST,* I-II. 13. 6.

Thus in regard to man's free choice and the efficient causality of the will, the following points may be established.

a) The will is determined to happiness – to the good in general. It is as in act in this respect that the will moves itself – and the intellect – in the determination of the means. This necessity is an absolute condition for the acts of the will which are free. For without this determination, the will would not be in act at all, and its causality in regard to the means could not occur. On the other hand, if the will were determined to some particular good, the will's act would not be free, but would have the type of natural necessity found in the sense appetites.

b) This determination to happiness, however, is not a determination in which the end is known in respect to its "contents." It is, of course, an inchoative determination to God, for man by his nature is ordered to God. That this is so, however, man must discover for himself so that he can direct his means properly to their due end. If he fails to do this, he cannot order his action to his real end, for as was said above, this ordering requires a grasp of the relation of means to end by reason.

c) The means are particular goods and as such do not specify man's volition by necessity. The only way in which a particular good could specify the act of the human will in this way would be if it were a necessary means to the end and known as such. But not all means are necessary in this way. Furthermore, those that are do not specify unless they are fully known as such. And such certitude does not occur in this life.[79] Hence the willing of the means is a free act.

d) In this free act, specification by the intellect is under the influence of the efficient causality of the will. If through counsel the intellect judges that there are several means, the will consents to them.[80] Consent is then materially an act of will, but as informed by the judgment of counsel. Choice does not require, however, that several means be discovered. If only one means is discovered, consent is not a separate act of will but is one with choice.[81] In either instance, though, consent is a free act.

e) Suppose several alternatives are discovered by counsel and that these alternatives appear as absolutely equal, how can a preference be given to one rather than to another? Since choice is formally an act of reason, it cannot be said simply that the choice is a mere fiat of will. St. Thomas remarks, "If two things be proposed as equal under one aspect, nothing hinders us from considering in one of them some

[79] Cf. *ST*, I. 82. 2.
[80] Cf. *ST*, I-II. 15. 4.
[81] Cf. *ibid.*, ad 3.

particular point of superiority, so that the will is turned towards that one rather than towards the other."[82] That is, after consenting to the alternatives, the will moves the intellect to consider some good in one rather than in the other; and the will chooses it as known as good by the intellect. The order of causality is important here: will as mover, intellect as moved; intellect as formal cause, will as material cause of the act of choice. Equality of alternatives is not necessary for free choice, however, nor is the presence of more than one good means necessary.

f) The efficient causality involved in consenting and choosing requires, above all, freedom of exercise. This aspect of freedom means not only that the will moves the intellect to consider *this* or *that* as a good, but that the will can move the intellect to consider not choosing as a good. Thus when a man discovers a certain means through counsel, he can move his intellect to consider it good not to choose this means or not to choose any one of the means presented, if there are several. This does not mean that the intellect presents the means as good and the will simply refuses to accept it. This would be unintelligible. It means, rather, that the will moves the intellect to consider the discovered means as not worth choosing without, however, moving the intellect to consider another good.

g) Thus it is seen how specification — in the order of formal causality — and exercise — in the order of efficient causality — are interrelated. The two are correlatives, and though distinct, are not separated in the concrete interaction of intellect and will. There is one point, however, that needs emphasizing. The will throughout this whole movement is a free cause. It is possible to describe its actions, give the conditions for its freedom, and show in what way it is not necessitated act; but the human intellect can never exhaust the mystery of this inherent freedom. It is possible to reach some understanding of it as an immanent action — an *actus perfecti,* the act of a being in act — but the act is analogous to the free creative activity of God; and just as a man cannot comprehend the primary analogate in this instance, so also he never achieves a complete understanding of man's participated freedom.

Two further problems are worth considering about the act of choice. If the will is the efficient cause of choice, how can it at the same time be the *subject* of the morally good or evil? St. Thomas states that the will can be the efficient cause of sin, for example, and yet be the subject of sin, because the distinction of material cause and efficient cause pertains to transient action, not to immanent acts.[83] In other

[82] *ST,* I-II. 13. 6 ad 3.
[83] *ST,* I-II. 79. 1 ad 3.

words, the act of choice as an elicited act is an act in the will, not an act received in another potency.[84] So the act of choice is both in the will materially as in a subject and from the will as from a principle.

The second point is whether there can be a habit in the will disposing it to the good. While the problem of virtues is not treated directly in this paper, it is well to note this particular question because the answer will make clearer the relation of will to reason, which relation has immediate significance for an understanding of the efficient causality of the will. Now in order to choose well, man needs habits in the sense appetites and in reason. Without the moral virtues and prudence man is not properly disposed for good action. But is there a habit in the will itself? In regard to the good of others — the divine good and the good of one's neighbor — there can be the good habit of justice. But the will cannot, according to St. Thomas, acquire a habit disposing it to will the good presented by reason. That is, there is no necessity for such a habit. Fortitude and temperance in the sense appetites, and prudence in the practical intellect, can be acquired. But a habit is necessary and can be developed only when a power's own proper nature is not sufficient for the purpose of doing well.

> Now the proper nature of a power is seen in its relation to its object. Since, therefore, the object of the will is the good of reason proportioned to the will, in respect of this the will does not need a virtue perfecting it.[85]

What St. Thomas is saying is this: The will by its nature is ordered to reason; it needs no added disposition to prompt it to follow reason, for the act of reason specifies the movement of the will; thus the will is not indeterminate in relation to reason and cannot act contrary to reason, although it may act contrary to *right* reason.

F. THE WILL AND THE ACTS OF *IMPERIUM* AND *USUS*[86]

Imperium is an act of reason, retaining in itself something of the will's act of choice.[87]

> Command is both an act of will and of reason, in different ways. It is an act of the will inasmuch as command implies inclination; it is an act of reason insofar as this inclination is distributed and ordered so that it may be accomplished in this particular way or that particular way.[88]

[84] Cf. *ST*, I-II. 6. 4.
[85] *ST*, I-II. 56. 6.
[86] In this section the command is viewed actively as proceeding from reason and will. In the next section command as passively received will be examined. Note that the order of execution is really a continuation of the "order of means."
[87] Cf. *ST*, I-II. 17. 1.
[88] *De Ver.*, 22. 12 ad 4.

Since to command is to direct, it is an act relating one thing to another; but, as was seen above, the act of relating is a cognitive not an appetitive act.

St. Thomas says, "After choice, the reason commands that power which has to do what was chosen; and then, last of all, someone's will begins the act of use, by executing the command of reason."[89] Thus command is substantially an act of reason; but the reason as commanding — as applying the relation of order — is not the efficient cause of movement, but the specifying cause. (What powers are specified will be explained below in the treatment of the commanded act.) The efficient cause of the commanded movement is the will's act of *usus,* for the will is that which moves the powers of the soul to their proper acts.[90]

Imperium is an intimation or declaration of order; it is an act of intellect as moved by will, and it specifies the movement of the powers commanded. Use is the act of the will moving the powers efficiently. Is there freedom in these acts? Insofar as the will moves the intellect to reflect and reconsider the commanded act as something to be chosen anew, there is freedom. As related to the preceding act of choice, the *imperium* and *usus* are necessary rather than free acts.

G. THE COMMANDED ACT

1. THE WILL AS MOVER OF THE OTHER POWERS

The movement of the powers of the soul *ex parte exercitii actus* is from the will as principal mover.[91] As the will desires the universal good, the acts of all the other powers fall under its object as particular goods.[92]

In a commanded act, the will applies a thing to operation — either an interior principle of operation (as the intellect for understanding, the power of locomotion for walking, and so on) or an external thing, as, for example, a stick for hitting. But the will does not use exterior things except through the intrinsic principles which are powers of man. So in considering the commanded act as coming efficiently from the will it is necessary to consider in what way the will moves the various powers.

a) *The will's movement of itself.* The will can be said to use itself.[93] The will's use of itself has been analyzed above.

b) *The will's movement of the intellect.* This has been treated

[89] *ST,* I-II. 17. 4 ad 1.
[90] Cf. *ST,* I-II. 16. 1. Of course, the will has been moving the intellect through the order of counsel and choice, and this can be called an act of use. Cf. *ibid.,* 4.
[91] Cf. *De Malo,* 6. unica.
[92] Cf. *ST,* I-II. 9. 1 and I. 82. 4.
[93] *ST,* I-II. 16. 4 ad 3.

earlier also. Here it is well to summarize the general way in which the will can use the intellect. In regard to the exercise of its act, the intellect can always be commanded. In regard to its object, the act whereby the intellect apprehends the truth about something is not due to the efficient movement of the will; the act of assenting to what is apprehended may be under the efficient influx of the will. The assent to first principles or to something which by its evidence convinces the intellect, is not due to the movement of the will. Indeed, the intellect may be forced to accept something which is unpleasing.[94] But some things which are apprehended do not convince the intellect to such an extent as to move it to assent or dissent; and in such instances, assent or dissent is subject to movement by the will.

c) *The will's movement of the internal senses.* The will moves the internal senses through its movement of reason. The apprehension of the imagination, for example, since it is a particular apprehension, is regulated by the apprehension of reason, which is universal.[95] This apprehension of the sense powers is limited by the perfection of the power itself. An incorporeal thing is not imaginable, and thus the imagination cannot be commanded to imagine it. Again, if the organ to which the imagination is united be indisposed, the act of imagining will be hindered.[96] In this movement of the internal senses (and the movement of the cogitative sense will be more important than those of the other internal senses in the moral act) the will is the efficient mover and the intellect is the specifying principle.

d) *The will's movement of sense appetite.* Like the imagination, the sense appetites are joined to corporeal organs; and hence their acts depend not only on the movement of the superior powers, but upon the disposition of the organs. The sense appetites, like the internal senses, have their own proper acts; but these acts can be caused by reason and will. In this way the sense appetites are passive to the rational powers.[97] The sense appetites can be moved by the rational powers in three ways. They are moved in the order of specification by

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[94] "Sed operatio intellectus potest esse contra inclinationem hominis, quae est voluntas; ut cum alicui placet aliqua opinio sed propter efficaciam rationum deducitur ad assentiendum contrarium per intellectum" (*De Ver.*, 22. 5 ad 3).

[95] Cf. *ST*, I-II. 17. 7.

[96] Cf. *ibid.*, ad 3.

[97] "Considerandum tamen quod, si virtus quae est actionis principium, ab alia superiori virtute moveatur, operatio ab ipsa procedens non solum est actio, sed etiam passio, inquantum scilicet procedit a virtute quae a superiori movetur. In homine autem omnes virtutes sensitivae partis moventur quodammodo a voluntate sicut a quodam primo principio. Eet ideo et audire et videre et imaginari et concupiscere et irasci non tantum sunt actiones, sed etiam quaedam passiones procedentes a motione voluntatis, inquantum scilicet homo ex propria voluntate ad praedicta progreditur" (*De Unione Verbi Incarnati*, 5).

reason; the reason proposes something as delightful or harmful through the medium of the internal senses, and the sense appetites are moved to joy or fear. They are moved by the will in the order of exercise.[98] Finally, while the movement of the sense appetites tends to express itself in outward movement of the body, this tendency can be checked by the will.[99] This mode of control of the sense appetites St. Thomas calls politic,[100] since the passions can, and sometimes do, follow sense cognition contrary to the inclinations of reason and will.

e) *The will's movement of the power of locomotion.* The power of locomotion is a distinct power of the soul.[101] Sometimes St. Thomas refers to it as a *vis motiva*.[102] This power can be moved by sense appetite.[103] However, this power can also be moved directly by the will.[104] And this control by will is complete or despotic.[105]

f) *The will, the vegetative acts, and the disposition of the body.* The acts of the vegetative powers are natural appetitive inclinations and are not subject to our command and use.[106] Movement of organs which are united to sense powers are subject to the command of the rational powers insofar as the powers themselves are. Thus the disposition of the body may be indirectly subject to reason and will.[107]

2. THE COMMANDED ACT AS A MORAL ACT

The commanded act is sometimes called the external act to distinguish it from the very act of the will itself. The commanded act is, of course, an act intrinsic to the human supposit. If the commanded act, however, involves the movement of the body — as in walking — it can be viewed as an "outward act." (The act of the intellect can be a commanded act, although it is not usually designated as an exterior act.) Frequently such an external act will involve the use of some

98 ". . . in viribus enim ordinatis ad invicem et connexis ita se habet, quod motus intensus in una eorum, et praecique in superiori, redundat in aliam. Unde, cum motus voluntatis per electionem intenditur circa aliquid, irascibilis et concupiscibilis sequitur motum voluntatis" (*De Ver.*, 25. 4). Thus St. Thomas says that this "overflowing" of the will's act into that of sense appetite is a sign of the intensity of the will's own act, and so indicates greater moral goodness or evil. Cf. *ST*, I-II. 24. 3 ad 1.

99 Cf. *De Ver.*, 25. 4.

100 Cf. *ST*, I. 81. 3 ad 2.

101 Cf. *ST*, I. 78. 1.

102 Cf. *ibid.*, ad 4, and *CG*, III. 10.

103 Cf. *De Virt. in Comm.*, 4: ". . . appetitus sensibilis, qui etiam movetur ab appetitu superiori in quantum ei obedit, et tunc iterum movet membra exteriora per sui imperium" (*ST*, I-II. 17. 9).

104 Cf. *De Ver.*, 25. 4.

105 Cf. *ST*, I. 81. 3 ad 2; *De Pot.*, 13. 15 ad 4.

106 Cf. *ST*, I-II. 17. 8.

107 ". . . dispositio corporalis, quae pertinet ad complexionem corporis, non subditur rationi. . . . Actualis vero transmutatio corporis, utpote accensio sanguinis circa cor vel aliquid huiusmodi quod actu passiones huiusmodi concomitatur, sequitur imaginationem, et propter hoc subditur rationi" (*De Ver.*, 25. 4 ad 5).

instruments distinct from the agent powers, such as a cane in walking or a pen in writing. It has been noted in what way these acts arise from the efficient causality of the will. A consideration of them as moral acts, however, will give further insight into their relationship to will and reason.

The commanded act frequently will involve a series of acts distinct numerically and in time, and yet will be one act viewed morally. On the other hand, the external act may be one continuous act according to its nature and yet involve several moral acts. Walking, for example, may be viewed as one continuous motion. Yet in the course of his walk the human agent may change his intention and thus change the morality of the commanded act.

One point that is relevant here is the way in which the commanded act is one with the act of the will informed through reason. St. Thomas's general principle is this: The interior act is as form to the commanded act as matter; the will is the principal cause, the moved power the instrumental cause of the external act.[108] As ordered by reason and will, the act of an inferior power is attributed to the superior powers.[109] The commanded act as ordered can be viewed as specified by reason — which relates the commanded act to the end desired — and this it is to be informed by reason. It can be viewed as moved efficiently by the will, as an instrument is moved by a principal agent.[110]

3. THE MORAL GOOD AND THE ONTOLOGICAL GOOD

From this consideration of the relationship of the will to the human act, it is possible to understand more fully the meaning of the moral good. St. Thomas says:

> And so we must say that every action has as much goodness as it has being. But inasmuch as it is lacking to some extent in the fullness of being which is due to human action, in so much it is lacking in goodness, and so is called evil. . . .[111]

What does he mean by this *plenitude* of being? A distinction is usually made between the ontological good and the moral good. A human action insofar as it is an action is an act and thus an ontological per-

[108] Cf. *ST*. I-II. 17. 4; 18. 6; III. 19. 2; *De Malo*, 2. 2.

[109] Cf. *De Ver.*, 22. 13.

[110] "Unde manifestum est quod uti primo et principaliter est voluntatis, tanquam primi moventis, rationis autem tanquam dirigentis; sed aliarum potentiarum tanquam exequentium quae comparantur ad voluntatem a qua applicantur ad agendum, sicut instrumenta ad principale agens" (*ST*, I-II. 16. 1).

[111] "Sic igitur dicendum est quod omnis actio, inquantum habet aliquid de esse, intantum habet de bonitate; inquantum vero deficit in aliquid de plenitudine essendi quae debetur actioni humanae intantum deficit a bonitate, et sic dicitur mala . . ." (*ST*, I-II. 18. 1).

fection, whereas it may not be morally good. Although this is a useful way of describing human actions, it is not an appropriate distinction, if one is to speak most technically. For the moral good is not something added to the ontological good, but is, rather, a type of ontological good. A moral evil, on the other hand, is a lack of ontological good. For the morally good act is good because of the real relation that exists between what is willed and right reason. This real relation is an ontological perfection. And it implies another relation, that in reason itself as related to the objective order. These relations in the existential order constitute the moral good. If these relations are absent, if reason is not rightly ordered to the objective order and right appetite, and/or if will is not ordered to right reason (but has perverted the reasoning of the practical intellect), then their absence constitutes the privation that is a moral evil. Not every ontological good is a moral good, but the ontological good which man can (it is in his power) and *should* (because of his nature and the divine law) cause (through reason and will) in his human actions is the moral good; and viewed metaphysically this moral good is constituted by the realities known as relations.

NOTES AND DISCUSSION

THE GERMAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS

Walter Brugger, S.J., and J. Lotz, S.J.

The third German Philosophical Congress was held in Bremen, October 2-5, 1950. Each day was devoted to a symposium, as the preliminary program had indicated. This new form, which has many advantages, was not fully perfected, since in some instances a real discussion did not take place.

In the foreground of interest were the humanistic themes. In "Might and Right," though there were a few who upheld legal positivism, the majority recognized supratemporal natural rights, even though there were some essential differences concerning their foundation. Concerning the "Formative Forces of History" there was no commonly accepted result in spite of some fundamental agreements; nevertheless, the insufficiency of the Marxist solution was clearly recognized by most. There was a surprising unanimity in "Situation and Crisis," concerning the absolute order of essences or at least of values involved in any situation. The value of "Language and Poetry" and of "Mythology" for the understanding of human nature was clearly seen. Although myth is one of the perennial forces of life and poetry, the return to a merely mythical view was not advocated.

The transition to the questions of the philosophy of nature was afforded by the symposium on "The Problem of Environment." Whereas brutes are restricted to their immediate environment, men are open to the world. This openness is implemented by man's striving to go beyond all that is finite. In the "Questions of the Philosophy of Nature" it became clear that the problem of microphysical indeterminacy could not yet be scientifically solved. The attention paid by scientists to the increasingly evident direction of chemically stimulated mutations should arouse the interest of philosophers to this instance of finality. The "Philosophical Foundations of Logistics" dealt with the theory of knowledge. It was evident that one and the same logic which is intimately bound up with the nature of the human spirit is active in the various forms of logic and logistical calculus.

In general, it may be concluded that in spite of differences about individual points there was a closer agreement on basic questions.

CHRONICLE

At Saint Louis University during the first semester of the current school year a seminar on philosophy and psychology was offered. Four members of the Department of Psychology and two members of the Department of Philosophy took part in the discussions. The seminar was the most elaborate interdepartmental venture that the Department of Philosophy of the University has co-operated in.

The annual meeting of the Southwestern Philosophical Conference was held in Fort Worth, Texas, December 28-30, 1950. At the opening session there was a discussion of the relations of philosophy to other disciplines. The session on ethics heard papers by Harry W. Beardsley, "The Need of Metaphysics in Ethical Theory"; James Street Fulton, "Scientific Materialism and Moral Insight"; Eugene I. Dyche, "Jordan's Metaphysical Ethics"; and Nathaniel M. Lawrence, "The Scope of Moral Principles: Machiavelli, Cassirer and Kant." The session on language and criticism heard papers by Gustav Mueller, "Philosophy of Language and the Language of Philosophy"; and Ian P. McGreal, "How is Criticism Possible?"; the session on metaphysics, papers by Hubert G. Alexander, "The Objective of Cultural Objectivity"; Harold N. Lee, "Belief, Knowledge and Science"; and Gerard Hinrichs, "The Significance of Huxley's Appraisal of Maine de Biran." The annual presidential address was given by the retiring president, Radoslav A. Tsanoff, on "Three Views of Reality: Being, Process, and Drama."

The Iowa Philosophical Association met for a program of papers and a business meeting at Grinnell College, October 26, 1950. Elected president was Neal W. Klausner (Grinnell College) and secretary-treasurer, William L. Reese (Drake University).

The Mississippi Philosophy Association held its organizational meeting on October 25, 1950. After the adoption of a constitution, Q. M. Lyon (University of Mississippi) was elected president, Ruth Body (Hinds Junior College) vice president, and Fred W. Neal (Mississippi State College) secretary-treasurer. Another meeting will be held in March.

The Mountain-Plains Philosophical Conference elected Sterling McMurrin (University of Utah) chairman and Archie J. Bahm (University of New Mexico) secretary-treasurer. The Conference will hold its next meeting at the University of New Mexico in October, 1951.

The fourth convocation of the Natural Law Institute at the College of Law, University of Notre Dame, was held on December 8 and 9. Speakers of the occasion were George E. Sokolsky, the Honorable Thomas J. Brogan, the Honorable Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., Felix

Morley, and the Reverend John C. Ford, S.J. The speakers considered the natural law and human rights and, in particular, the rights to liberty, property, freedom of expression, and the pursuit of happiness.

The ownership of *Traditio,* a periodical publishing "studies in ancient and medieval history, thought, and religion," has been taken over by Fordham University. The board of editors will be Dr. Stephan Kuttner, the Reverend Edwin A. Quain, S.J., and the Reverend Anselm Strittmatter, O.S.B.

The natural law was the general subject of the "Archbishop Ireland Memorial Lectures" at the College of St. Thomas, St. Paul. The speakers were: Jacques Maritain, Anton-Hermann Chroust, Heinrich A. Rommen, the Honorable Stuart Sinclair Garson, K.C., Ben W. Palmer, and Goetz Briefs.

M. Etienne Gilson, member of the French Academy, gave three lectures on Scotus and a lecture on "Historical Research and the Future of Scholasticism" at the University of Notre Dame, November 30 to December 2. He repeated this last lecture under the auspices of Marquette University on December 3.

Dr. Karl Friedrich Kunze of Aachen has conceived the idea of an international festival of art and culture. As a beginning, "Aachener Musiktage" will be held for three days between May and October of each year. When the sister arts take part in this festival, it will be called "Aachener Kulturtag." An international organization is in the process of formation, with the immediate aim of an Atlantic-Europa-Kulturtag, and the ultimate aim of a Welt-Kulturtag. International headquarters at Aachen are planned to include a general secretariate, a printing press, and concert and display halls. Dr. Kunze considers the prototypes of this cultural commonwealth of nations to have been the Olympic festivals and the Christian commonwealth of Charlemagne.

A movement is under way to create a world federalist university. As a preliminary stage, courses on federalism will be given in Paris in 1950 and 1951 and in Frankfurt am Main. These classes are under the patronage of an honorary committee, among whom are to be found M. Jacques Maritain, M. Gaston Berger, and M. Daniel-Rops.

The *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* completed its sixtieth year of publication in 1950. A congress was held at Fulda, April 29 to May 2. The papers read on that occasion are being printed in Volume LX, the anniversary volume. THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN adds its congratulations to the good wishes of the philosophers.

BOOK REVIEWS

A STUDY OF HEGEL'S LOGIC. By G. R. G. Mure. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. viii + 375.

Professor Mure has now followed up his excellent *An Introduction to Hegel* (1940) with this equally helpful introduction to the central portion of Hegel's philosophy, the logical doctrine. The major task of the present *Study* is to provide an exposition and commentary upon the logical foundations of the Hegelian dialectic. Following Hegel's own triadic arrangement of materials, the work is mainly concerned with the theory of being (chaps. 2-4), the theory of essence (chaps. 5-9), and the theory of notion (chaps. 10-18). Since Hegel combines the categories of being and essence into the Objective Logic (in opposition to the category of notion as the Subjective Logic), Mure gives about equal consideration to the two main divisions of the Logic. Like every student, he was faced with the initial problem of following either the *Science of Logic* itself or the first, logical part of the *Encyclopaedia*. Fortunately, he has taken neither text as an exclusive source. Each has its typical fault as a basis of explanation. The *Science of Logic* elaborates problems in such fine detail that the reader is apt to get hopelessly lost in peripheral difficulties; the so-called Smaller Logic of the *Encyclopaedia* is terse to the point of obscuring the dialectical continuity and richness of speculation. Mure has avoided both pitfalls, seeking rather to synthesize the clarity and concentrated economy of the Smaller Logic with the sweep and implication of the Larger Logic.

He has achieved this aim with a high measure of success. The touchstone of such an undertaking is always the treatment accorded to the theory of essence, which is generally recognized both as Hegel's most valuable contribution in this field and as the most difficult category to understand. Mure has restated the dialectic of introreflection, appearance, and actuality with rare skill and lucidity. Indeed, he has bestowed so much careful reflection upon the chapters on essence that those on being and notion suffer somewhat by comparison.

This is due in part, however, to the text itself of Hegel. There is a schematic and anticipatory air about Hegel's analysis of notion and its subcategories. For in this sphere he is incorporating the results of formal logic and suggesting a framework for controlling the vast amounts of empirical data in the scientific and humanistic disciplines. As for the first part of the Logic, the moment of being, it is at once extremely abstract and shrouded in the obscurity of the problem of the absolute beginning of the dialectical movement. These traits are faithfully, perhaps too faithfully, reflected in Mure's treatment of being and notion.

In the first chapter and the last four, the author gives his own critical reaction to this doctrine. His opening discussion on the relation between language and logic is, in effect, a Hegelian counterattack upon logical positivism, especially upon Wittgenstein's theory of thought and language. From the Hegelian standpoint, the verbal sign makes its first appearance as an outgrowth of symbol at the level of presentation (*Vorstellung*), which is that moment in the dialectic of subjective spirit which immediately precedes thinking. Hence language precedes thought (as a subsequent dialectical moment) and cannot be regarded as a neutral, tailor-made outfit with which to clothe any and every instance of thought. This objection tells against the attempt of logical empiricism to devise a fixed, mathematico-symbolical language into which philosophical thinking can be cast and by which it can be tested. Two other remarks are of even greater weight against this semanticism. Although verbal language precedes thinking, it also subserves its ends, both at the level of understanding and of reason. Hence there is a constantly developing context of thought, which must provide the clue for interpreting a set of verbal signs that also develops but not *pari passu* with the mind itself. Philosophical difficulties cannot all be solved (or dissolved) by reduction to linguistic rules of transformation. Finally, presentation and its main tool, language, are themselves phases in the self-development of spirit. The latter is the active, growing notion itself, which uses language to find and express an ever-increasing fullness of meaning. Its proper vehicle is not an abstract, fixed, quasi-mathematical set of symbols, which cannot convey the many-levelled dynamism of mind. Mure's criticism is a notable indication that idealism is recovering from the shock of logical empiricism's attack and is again taking the offensive.

Mure qualifies his acceptance of Hegel's absolute idealism. He singles out a nucleus of Hegelianism that seems to him to provide the indubitable minimum of all philosophical speculation. No thinking is possible except on the assumption of an original identity of

thought and being. Their subsequent differentiation in the stages of human experience is itself the outcome of the auto-activity of the absolute spirit. This premise must be admitted in order to have definite assurance against scepticism. Moreover, there can be no life of the spirit and no philosophizing without the enlivening contradiction between thought and its other. Can this basic dualism ever be overcome in a total reconciliation of extremes? Hegel's attitude before this question is ambiguous. His reply is in the affirmative, as long as he concentrates upon the thesis that his philosophy coincides with the ultimate self-manifestation of absolute mind. From this perspective, the complete synthesis of all elements in experience is assured in the very recognition that every set of differences is self-postulated by spirit. But Hegel's dependence upon contingent and enlarging data in the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit implies that even his synthesis of materials under their a priori forms is subject to eventual revision in the light of fresh empirical findings.

Mure adheres to this latter view. He denies that the dichotomies can be definitely subsumed. He points to the persistent need of philosophy for linguistic expression, the all-pervasive determination of experience by given conditions of space and time, and the universal contrast between empirical and a priori factors in experience and knowledge. There always remains an irreducible, sheerly given, factual aspect in the content of experience. Hence the dialectical process cannot but contain a residue that refuses to be sublated entirely in a higher synthesis. Critical revision of philosophy remains not only a possibility but a pressing requirement in view of novel and compelling deliverances of experience which are subject to no predetermined charting.

Although this explicit rejection of systematic finality entails a profound modification of Hegelianism, it does not bring Mure any closer to realism. This is clear from his reaffirmation of the basic idealistic postulate on the original oneness of thought and being, which is to be retained in its full rigor as a categorical truth. This compromise settlement constitutes the chief weakness of the present book. For the author does not demonstrate that the initial assumption about the identification of mind with the real in its totality can be anything more than a hypothesis, once the ability of absolute idealism to overcome all contrasts of otherness is rejected in principle. What lent force to Hegel's primary thesis was his conviction that at least in principle the philosophy of the absolute represented the plenary reconciliation and reincorporation of all residual factors within the achieved actuality of the philosophical mind. His waverings had to do with the detailed

working out of this claim, not with the assertion itself or the conviction of ultimate success. Hence in denying the latter, Mure has undermined the ground upon which the assumed unity of thought and being in the Logic can be taken as categorical.

It may be objected that if this unity is a primary assumption, then it rests upon nothing prior. This objection is worth facing, since an answer to it would require the reconsideration of the relation between the *Science of Logic* and the *Phenomenology of Mind.* The first generation of Hegelians and anti-Hegelians were locked in a struggle over this issue. A thorough re-examination of the question has been attempted by Hyppolite, Kojève, and other leaders in the French renascence of Hegelianism. But neither in the *Introduction* nor in the *Study* has Mure addressed himself to the problem of the nature of the connection between these twin bases of Hegel's philosophy. Yet Hegel himself remarks that the sense in which the *Science of Logic* is "scientific" can only be determined through a study of the *Phenomenology,* the express purpose of which is to lead the empirical mind to the standpoint of scientific, absolute idealism. This standpoint is nothing less than the recognition of the identity of the experiencing, knowing subject and the various modes of the other within the all-encompassing absolute mind. Only after human consciousness has made the full odyssey recorded in the *Phenomenology* is it compelled and justified in making the universal assumption about thought and being upon which the *Science of Logic* depends. Until he has shown that the argument of the *Phenomenology* is cogent, Mure has no ground for claiming categorical status for the idealistic assumption. And if it is treated as a hypothetical and directional tendency, then the drift of Mure's criticism of Hegel is that the hypothesis does not conform with the actual achievements in philosophy. It is a necessary assumption of philosophical thinking, only on condition that philosophy and absolute idealism are one and the same. This is the one point that cannot be assumed as among philosophers of different minds.

Although Mure repeats the argument of the *Phenomenology* concerning the latent universal characters in sense intuition, he does not subject it to critical analysis at the very point where it is relevant for the initial premise of the Logic. He questions whether the other revealed in sense perception is ever fully sublated, but he allows to pass unchallenged the view that explanation of sense perception is only possible where mind is held to have first externalized the brute facts, of which we must take note in perception. This is precisely the point at issue. At the other end of the dialectic, Mure fights shy of any prolonged reflection on the treatment of religion in the *Phenomenology.*

Now the transition from religion to philosophy is the culminating and indispensable dialectical guarantee of the unconditional oneness of mind, its objects, and every sort of other in our experience. Unless the empirical mind is able both to expose the illusion and grasp the manifestation of truth in the religious attitude, it cannot achieve the final insight into the nature of philosophy as the scientific, systematic self-articulation of the absolute in human experience. And until this insight is gained, categorical assurance about the oneness of thought and being, as well as about the ultimately spiritual character of reality, is lacking. The activity of "assuming" the originary unity has no scientific and categorical standing until the dialectic of the *Phenomenology* has been critically justified, especially in its initial moment of sense intuition and its penultimate moment of religious worship.

JAMES COLLINS

St. Louis University

MAURICE BLONDEL OU LE DEPASSEMENT CHRETIEN. By Jacques Paliard. Paris: Julliard, 1950. Pp. 304. 450 fr.

In this stimulating and profound book by a disciple of Maurice Blondel — his successor as professor of philosophy at the Faculté des Lettres of Aix — we see better than before how great a master the regretted Catholic philosopher was.

His philosophic journey is here retraced according to the *Propos recueillis par Frédéric Lefèvre* of 1928. This is followed by a thorough study of "the two conjoined and complementary . . . methods" of M. Blondel, "his attitude in life" and that "reflection, absolutely free and independent . . . which knows no other guide than the demand of reason" (pp. 65-66). He excludes nothing from his starting point, which is the whole of his experience, and his dialectic progress does not encumber itself with any unverified presupposition. The author of *Intuition et Réflexion* and *Le Théorème de la connaissance,* J. Paliard himself, reveals his own method in acutely analyzing that of M. Blondel. There is a double advantage in this. By disengaging that total sincerity based on love, which characterizes the pursuit of the master, his "metaphysical power," J. Paliard shows us still more clearly the secret of him who had Léon Ollé-Laprune as master at the Ecole Normale. That integral dialectic of the concrete, that method of implication, which none of the works of M. Blondel have failed to press to its limit, that necessity of constant searching without ever

stopping or being lulled to sleep in a system of concepts – this is what the philosopher of *L'Action* discovered and practised. The trilogy of *thought, being,* and *acting* is the result.

Passing from the method to the doctrine, J. Paliard shows how, in *La Pensée, L'Etre et les êtres,* and the new *L'Action,* Maurice Blondel discovered the divine Transcendent in the heart of the human or simply cosmic immanent. Even here, while we are still waiting for *La Philosophie et l'Esprit chrétien,* it becomes the testimony of a Christian thinking his faith, "the doctrine of Blondel is a religion, prepares . . . in its own proper movement for the call of that 'Good News,' the specific meditation on which will produce . . . a philosophy of religion" (p. 213, n. 1). The *dépassement philosophique* calls for the *dépassement chrétien.*

Two very profound complementary studies complete the work of J. Paliard. The first treats of *L'Anti-existentialisme de Maurice Blondel*; the second is called *A propos de l'idée d'agnition dans la philosophie de Maurice Blondel.* It would have been worth while to have them included here.

BLAISE ROMEYER, S.J.

Vals
Le Puy en Velay

CHRISTIANITY AND HISTORY. By Herbert Butterfield. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1950. Pp. vi + 146. $2.75.

The troublous times in which we live have driven many historians to inquire into the "meaning" of their science in the hope of discovering a purpose in history and a pattern underlying seemingly chaotic human happenings. Herbert Butterfield, recognized as one of the most exacting of professional historians, has turned his attention to this subject in his *Christianity and History.*

Although these seven lectures are by no means "the most outstanding pronouncement on the meaning of history made by a professional historian in England since Acton's inaugural" – as the publisher claims – nevertheless they are sound, worthwhile observations on the nature of history. Butterfield does not propose to solve any problems or work out a philosophy of history. His lectures are essentially observations made by an urbane, seasoned historian. They abound with good sense and a balanced view of all past happenings.

Others, such as Karl Löwith and Berdyaev, have handled the contribution of Christianity to Western history in better fashion than Butterfield. But the latter develops two important points, which this reviewer considers his principal contribution to our thinking about the nature of history. The first is his wise insistence on the limits of scientific history. "Those are gravely wrong," he insists, "who regard it as the queen of the sciences, or think of it as a substitute for religion, a complete education in itself." The second contribution is his analysis of human nature in history with his stress on man's universal sinfulness. Butterfield, incidentally, has a much sharper appreciation of sin than he has of grace – perhaps a healthy thing when most historians are still convinced that man can pull himself up by his own bootstraps to a more perfect world in the future.

THOMAS P. NEILL

Saint Louis University

A RHETORIC OF MOTIVES. By Kenneth Burke. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950. Pp. xv + 340. $5.00.

Aristotle makes the statement in his *Rhetoric* that if all men were perfectly reasonable there would be no need for the emotional appeal of rhetoric in forensic oratory, where the decision should be determined solely by the facts of the case. But Aristotle was realist enough to recognize that men are not merely rational creatures but creatures of emotion as well and that, consequently, the emotional appeal has a place not only in a deliberative and an epideictic but also in a forensic speech. If the orator expects to persuade an audience, he must appeal not only to reason but also to the emotions, whether his speech is a political address, a public encomium, or a legal defence. To persuade an audience, therefore, the orator cannot be content with mere logical proof and arrangement; he must also make an appeal to the emotions of his listeners through the style of his address. No one has improved very much on Aristotle's analysis of the character and emotions of listeners and of the rhetorical means of appealing to them.

Since man is this compound of reason and emotion, rhetoric has come to be recognized as a necessary part of education, and style as a necessary part of rhetoric. In every important epoch of Western civilization, the rhetorical motive has been re-examined and readjusted to fit the educational needs of the times. Aristotle, Isocrates, Cicero, Quintilian, Alcuin, St. Augustine, Erasmus, Wilson, Blair, and Genung

are only a few of the important rhetoricians who tried to integrate rhetoric into the educational procedures and ideals of their times. We are living in an age of "educated" illiteracy when anything like a conscious rhetorical style has fled both the pulpit and the public platform. What about the rhetorical motive in our age?

Kenneth Burke's *A Rhetoric of Motives* is an attempt to show how prominent the rhetorical motive and method have been all through history and how prominent they still are in modern experience, even though there is so little attention given to rhetoric as such in our schools. In our day, the perennial rhetorical appeals have taken refuge on blazing billboards, in the embroidered rhetoric of advertising, in political pamphleteering, and ideological propaganda. In the first part of his book, entitled "The Range of Rhetoric," Mr. Burke tries to show that in modern times the rhetorical motive has been broadened from mere persuasion to what he calls "identification"; the second part is concerned with the shifting ideas concerning the rhetorical motive from Aristotle to Empson; and the third part, entitled "Order," tries to show what elements of Marxism, Freudianism, and other modern ideologies might contribute to a theory of modern rhetorical appeal.

There is certainly need for a book which would do what Mr. Burke sets out to do under these headings, but this reviewer is of the opinion that this work does not fulfill that need. The work consists too largely of poorly integrated and uncritical summaries of the opinions of rhetoricians, theorists, and critics and of dubious analyses of the rhetorical motive at work in modern experience — all expressed in a style hopelessly muddied and clotted by an overtechnical language of the author's own invention. But more fundamentally disturbing than the gobbledygook of Mr. Burke's style is the impression that the author is observing the shifting panorama of the rhetorical motive not with any solid conviction about absolute truth or the real nature of language, but from an entirely relativist point of view. If any personal viewpoint is discoverable in this confused and confusing book, it is that of the modern exaggerated semantic — which is only another name for a nominalist. The dust jacket calls the book "semantics with a difference"; it is a difference which is quite expendable.

M. B. McNAMEE, S.J.

Saint Louis University

LEÇONS DE PHILOSOPHIE DES SCIENCES EXPERIMENTALES. By Auguste Grégoire, S.J. Paris: J. Vrin, 1950. Pp. 230.

This work was left in an incomplete form at the death of its author on October 19, 1949. The present work includes a French version, somewhat changed, of an article on Brunschvicg which appeared in THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN in 1940 and an article on the idealism of the Vienna Circle which appeared in the *Revue des Questions Scientifiques* in 1939. The fifth and final chapter is a development of the ideas and notes of Father Grégoire made by P. Gaston Isaye, S.J.

The first chapter deals with the formation of the scientific method from Aristotle and Greek astronomy to Newton. The second treats the problem of induction from J. S. Mill to Lachelier. The third takes up physical theory in France in the twentieth century, discussing Duhem, Le Roy, Poincaré and Meyerson.

The view of experimental science throughout this book is a simplified version of the theory of P. Joseph Maréchal, S.J. The authors rarely touch on experimental or theoretical science directly. Usually they are concerned with authors who philosophize about science. From all this discussion a theory emerges, which, briefly, might be centered about these three points: (*a*) there is an a priori in physical theory; (*b*) this a priori element is absolutely necessary for the human mind; (*c*) the very necessity of the a priori element or form of science guarantees at once its own objectivity and that of the science.

It is one thing to see that modern physical or natural science uses ideal constructions in the elaboration of theory. It is quite a different thing to assert the necessity of such constructions. And the conclusion that physical science is the most perfect and the typical form of human knowledge is a conclusion still further removed from the first insight.

For it is quite true (and even rather widely admitted) that modern science uses ideal constructions, "applies concepts to reality." We can call these concepts "a priori forms of knowledge," if we must, and likewise admit that knowledge changes its object — if we are speaking of this kind of knowledge.

Secondly, it has been repeatedly said that constructions are necessary in science. As M. Jacques Maritain has shown, the application of mathematical concepts to physical knowledge has resulted in a great enrichment of theory and brilliant success in practice. In this way, the constructs of science have justified themselves and can even be called (hypothetically) necessary. Moreover, it seems to be true that some ideal constructions must be employed in order to gain any syste-

matic and coherent knowledge of reality at the physico-chemical and plant levels. This necessity, however, is not so much a necessity of the human mind as it is an inherent character of objects which are scarcely intelligible in themselves (*minus nota in se*). Even here, however, the a priori or ideal elements do not precede all knowledge of their objects, but only systematic knowledge; and it seems that other constructs could also be used, though perhaps with less success.

But to transfer what is true of a systematically constructed science to all our knowledge of the real seems unwarranted. Such a transfer is kept from having serious consequences only by a roundabout process which finds the real and the ideal ultimately identified in God and thus "objectifies" knowledge through finality.

The book, however, is by no means useless. It is filled with careful summaries of many modern theories of science and has some brilliant criticisms.

GEORGE P. KLUBERTANZ, S.J.

Saint Louis University

POWER AND MORALS. By Martin J. Hillenbrand. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. xi + 217.

The author states in the Foreword to his book that "the winning of the war has not solved our political and social problems" and that they will not be settled until the basic "problem of power" is solved. His thesis is that the Western philosophies of positivism, utilitarianism, and pragmatism are rooted in the same "power conception" of politics as are the philosophies of Communism and Fascism. This thesis is well defended in the first half of the book. The second portion of the book is devoted to a treatment of natural law and of the function of violence.

The reader gets the impression that the book was written as the fruit of a well-spent term of graduate study and that it was written in a hurry. The study is marred, unfortunately, by all-too-familiar graduate-school jargon; so many "isms," "ologies," and professors have a way of burying the real questions. The author tells us that his book was written "after much . . . interruption," after the pages had been "lost, and scattered and laboriously reassembled." The labor was certainly worth while, but it would perhaps be an even more rewarding task were the author to adopt a slower pace and a more elementary kind of treatment. The chapter on natural law, for example, is good in many respects but fails to bring out the primacy of right desire in practical truth.

CHARLES N. R. McCOY

Saint Louis University

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS PUBLISHED IN THE UNITED STATES

For the purpose of this bibliography, "philosophy" will be understood in a very broad sense. It will include works in other fields—such as sociology, aesthetics, and politics—that involve philosophical principles and problems.

"Current" books will be understood to include new books, revised editions, and reprints if the previous printing had been out of stock for a notable period of time, or if there is a notable difference in price, format, and the like.

The procedure is as follows:

1. Books announced for publication will be listed in the issue which next appears after the announcement is received.
2. Books actually published will be listed in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 above.
3. Books received by THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN will be listed with full bibliographical information and a descriptive and/or critical note in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 and/or No. 2. This will be done even if a full review is to appear later.

BASIL THE GREAT, ST. *Ascetical Works.* Translated by Sister M. Monica Wagner. New York: Fathers of the Church, 1950. Pp. 537. $4.50.

BERGSON, HENRI. *Matter and Memory.* (Reprint) New York: Macmillan Co., 1950. $2.75.

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BOOKSTABER, PHILIP DAVID. *The Idea of Development of the Soul in Medieval Jewish Philosophy.* Philadelphia: Maurice Jacobs, 1950. Pp. 104. $2.00.

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John Dewey en sus Noventa Anos. Washington: Pan American Union, 1949. Pp. 45. 20¢

John Stuart Mill's Philosophy of Scientific Method. Edited with an Introduction by Ernest Nagel. New York: Hafner Pub. Co., 1950. Pp. 1 + 461. Paper, $2.50; cloth, $4.50.

This is the twelfth volume of the "Hafner Library of Classics." It contains selections from the *System of Logic* and *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy.* All omissions have been clearly indicated, so that ready reference can be made from this edition to the unabridged editions. The selections give a full and complete picture of Mill's logic, scientific method, and theory of knowledge.

The Introduction by Ernest Nagel contains a short biography, a review of Mill's works, and a critical summary of the contents of the present volume. Professor Nagel clearly indicates the empiricist associationism which underlies the whole logic. He points out two basic assumptions about the nature of indubitable data as "sensations" and the need for evaluating knowledge by investigating the origin of ideas (p. xxxiv). He shows that there is a great difference between showing how an idea originated by association and what its meaning and validity are. The final section of the Introduction reviews the history of the empiricist movement.

KANT, IMMANUEL. *Prolegomena To Any Future Metaphysics.* Introduction by Lewis W. Beck. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1950. $1.75.

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LAWSON, JOHN HOWARD. *The Hidden Heritage.* New York: Citadel Press, 1950. Pp. 585. $3.50.

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LEVI, WERNER. *Fundamentals of World Organization.* Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1950. Pp. 242. $3.00.

MARROU, HENRI-IRENEE. *L'Ambivalence du Temps de l'Histoire chez Saint Augustin.* Montréal: Institut d'Etudes Médiévales — Paris: J. Vrin, 1950. Pp. 84. Paper, $1.00; cloth, $1.50.

In the Conférence Albert le Grand for 1950, the noted historian and long-time student of St. Augustine examines a topic of great interest for philosophers, theologians, and historians: the meaning and the direction of human history. He points out that for St. Augustine the ultimate meaning of history is known only by faith. But faith does not tell us the meaning of particular details or moments in the life of mankind. In St. Augustine's teaching of the Two Cities which are inextricably mingled throughout history, we have a recognition of the ambiguity of almost every movement and the responsibility of personal choice, since we cannot entrust ourselves blindly to any movement in the concrete.

A stimulating and profound essay.

McELROY, HOWARD C. *Modern Philosophers.* New York: Russell F. Moore Co., 1950. Pp. xii + 268. $4.00.

This is an account of modern philosophy from Kant to Bertrand Russell and Albert Schweitzer. The philosophers of this period are grouped topically around their main preoccupations, which the author divides into four divisions. When he deals with immediate contemporaries, his summaries and analyses are satisfactory; when he dips back into history, he is scarcely reliable.

The author's style is uneven. The printing is unattractive and filled with mistakes (even the table of contents has a glaring error); the bibliography is too brief to be of much help.

McKEON, RICHARD P., and ROKKAN, STEIN. *Democracy in a World of Tensions.* A Symposium prepared by UNESCO. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1950. Pp. 574. $4.50.

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RICHARDS, IVOR ARMSTRONG. *Coleridge on Imagination.* [2nd ed.] New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1950. Pp. 251. $3.75.

SINNOTT, EDMUND WARD. *Cell and Psyche.* Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1950. Pp. 121. $2.00.

SMITH, VINCENT EDWARD. *Idea-Men of Today.* Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1950. Pp. x + 434. $5.00.

This is a series of essays on some of the most prominent thinkers and movements of the present time. Originally aimed at a college discussion group, the book is written for a well-educated reader, though special training in technical philosophy is not presupposed. The chapters center around Dewey, Santayana, Whitehead, Russell, semantics, Freud, Marxism, Bergson, existentialism, the problem of knowledge, and the problem of being and evolution. These problems and thinkers are discussed by Dr. Smith with his customary skill and lucidity.

There are some references for further reading and an index.

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